Howard v Charlton

Protection under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 depends principally on the agreement, not merely on the physical characteristics of the structure at a later date. The Act applies where an agreement entitles the occupier to station a mobile home on a protected site and occupy it as their only or main residence. The agreement must be interpreted according to ordinary contractual principles. An owner cannot terminate it simply by asserting that an extension has caused the structure to cease to be a mobile home, unless a contractual termination provision is properly engaged. Any breach ordinarily requires notice to remedy and a finding that termination is reasonable. The mobility definition may have different practical significance in different statutory contexts.

Mrs Charlton occupied a mobile home under an agreement made in 1984 and later acquired by her predecessor. She added a small, bolted-on porch extension and altered the roof. Mrs Howard, who acquired the park in 1999, sought possession on the ground that the home, considered with the extension, was no longer a mobile home because it could not be moved as a single unit or lawfully moved on the highway.

The Canterbury County Court held that the extension had not changed the character of the original structure and dismissed the possession claim. Mrs Howard appealed. The central issue was whether the agreement and the statutory protections could be terminated, or cease to apply, merely because the structure had been altered.

1. Appeal dismissed. The possession claim failed because the agreement had not been validly terminated in accordance with its terms.
2. The starting point was the agreement, which was initially an agreement to which the Mobile Homes Act 1983 applied. The statutory terms did not displace ordinary principles of contractual interpretation.
3. The agreement contained specific termination provisions. Termination for breach required notice to remedy the breach within a reasonable time and a further finding that termination was reasonable. Any earlier breach concerning the extension had been treated as waived. The agreement contained no independent ground permitting termination merely because the structure ceased to satisfy the statutory definition of a mobile home.
4. The Act applies to an agreement under which the occupier is entitled to station a mobile home on relevant land. The relevant criterion is therefore the agreement and the entitlement it confers, rather than the physical structure viewed in isolation. The original caravan remained on the site, and the porch was within the matters contemplated by the agreement, which expressly referred to porches and other structures.
5. The court declined to decide the wider questions concerning the interpretation of the caravan definitions in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and the Caravan Sites Act 1968, including movement as a single unit and highway legality. Those questions were context-dependent and did not arise for decision.

Lord Justice Carnwath gave the judgment. Lord Justice Clarke and Lord Justice Ward agreed. The appeal was dismissed, with no order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Canterbury County Court dismissed. The court upheld the refusal of possession.
• Canterbury County Court: His Honour Judge Poulton held that the porch extension had not changed the character of the original structure as a mobile home and dismissed the possession claim.