Williams v Jones & Anor

Where a tenancy is determined for limitation purposes under Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980, a former tenant who remains in possession will normally be treated as being in adverse possession without having to start afresh by proving possession as a trespasser. The tenant’s prior lawful possession is material. The exceptional case is one where the tenant’s connection with the land has become so feeble that the tenant is no longer in possession.

Possession must still be continuous. Acts relied on as dispossessing the former tenant must be assessed in context. Grazing land should be considered in light of the former tenancy and the purpose for which the land was occupied. A former tenant need not establish an intention to possess as owner.

The claimant, a sheep farmer, claimed possessory title to grazing land known as the Mwd. He and his father had occupied the land as tenants. Rent ceased in 1973 or 1974, but the claimant remained in occupation and performed services in lieu of rent for a period.

The county court found that the tenancy had continued until its statutory determination, that the claimant had remained in continuous possession, and that later acts by others had not dispossessed him for limitation purposes. It also made a separate finding that he had not established factual possession and the necessary animus possidendi under the approach in Powell v McFarlane. The defendants appealed on the interpretation of Schedule 1 paragraphs 5 and 8 and on the adequacy of the possession evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that, under paragraphs 5 and 8 of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980, the possession of a tenant normally moves from possession with the landlord’s consent to adverse possession when the tenancy is determined for limitation purposes. Paragraph 8 remains applicable, but it does not require every former tenant to be treated as a newcomer or trespasser. An extremely feeble connection with the land might mean that the former tenant was no longer in possession, but that exceptional circumstance did not arise here. [1]-[4]
2. The distinction between a trespasser case and a former tenant case is material. In the former, animus possidendi may be required to establish dispossession of the paper owner. In the latter, the former tenant will normally continue in possession because the freeholder originally permitted entry. The court followed the approach in Haywood v Chaloner. [1]-[4]
3. The claimant’s possession was continuous. The matters relied on as interrupting possession did not do so: the landlord’s agent could reasonably have ejected a trespasser in the context of the landlord-and-tenant relationship; straying sheep could not dispossess the claimant; a television mast was at most casual trespass; the evidence concerning planted trees was obscure; and the work performed in lieu of rent formed part of the continuing tenancy. [5]
4. It was artificial to assess the claimant’s grazing of sheep as if he were a stranger to the land. The use had to be considered in the light of the former tenancy, the nature of the land and the purpose for which the claimant occupied it. Against that background, grazing was not equivocal. [6]
5. The judge’s further observations also substantially satisfied the factual-possession criterion described in Powell v McFarlane. His approach to animus possidendi, if it required an intention to possess as owner, was erroneous. That point did not affect the outcome because the governing finding was continuous possession following the tenancy. [7]
6. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s costs were to be assessed under the Community Legal Service (Costs) Regulations 2000. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the possession proceedings in Llangefni County Court was dismissed. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
• Llangefni County Court: The judge found that the claimant had remained in continuous possession of the land from 1971 and that later acts had not dispossessed him for limitation purposes.