Tassell & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc

A second appeal requires permission under Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55(1), and Civil Procedure Rules, rule 52.13. Permission may be granted only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason to hear it. A bankruptcy court cannot ordinarily go behind an unpaid judgment debt where statutory demands based on that debt have not been set aside. Repeated attempts to relitigate matters already determined do not establish unfairness under Article 6 of the Convention. A bankrupt has no standing to pursue claims vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, and cannot authorise proceedings on behalf of a company while disqualified from acting as its director.

Mr and Mrs Tassell were made bankrupt on petitions founded on an unpaid judgment debt. Their appeals against the bankruptcy orders were dismissed by Hart J. They sought permission for second appeals to the Court of Appeal, together with ancillary applications, alleging procedural unfairness and Convention violations.

They also sought permission to appeal an order of Jacob J striking out proceedings against the bank. Those proceedings included claims which had vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and claims brought on behalf of a company without authority. The central issues were whether the second-appeal threshold was met, whether the bankruptcy courts could revisit the underlying judgment debt, and whether the applicants had standing to pursue the later proceedings.

1. Applications concerning the bankruptcy orders. Permission to bring the second appeals was refused. The applications did not raise an important point of principle or practice and disclosed no other compelling reason for a second appeal under section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
2. The bankruptcy orders were based on an unpaid judgment debt, following service of statutory demands and the exhaustion of the procedure for setting those demands aside. The district judge and Hart J were not entitled to go behind the judgment debt or reopen the merits of the earlier litigation.
3. The applicants’ reliance on Article 6 of the Convention was misconceived. Nothing in the bankruptcy proceedings suggested that the requirements of a fair trial had been infringed. The fact that the original judgment had been entered summarily did not justify reopening issues already determined through proceedings in which opportunities to seek appellate relief had been exercised.
4. The ancillary applications, including the proposed European Court of Justice referrals and applications for extensions of time, disclosure and joinder, were also refused because they had no stronger basis than the proposed appeals.
5. Application concerning the later Chancery proceedings. Permission to appeal was struck out. Once the bankruptcy orders could no longer be challenged, claims vested in the trustee in bankruptcy could not be pursued by the bankrupt applicants. The applicants also lacked standing to pursue proceedings on behalf of the company, since section 11 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 made it unlawful for an undischarged bankrupt to act as a director or participate in the management of a company. The related referral application was struck out.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission for second appeals against Hart J’s orders was refused. Ancillary applications were refused. The application concerning Jacob J’s order was struck out.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Hart J dismissed the appeals against the bankruptcy orders. Jacob J ordered that the later claims be struck out.
• Southend County Court: bankruptcy orders were made against each applicant.