Abbas v Hammond Suddards (A Firm)

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success. A claim against solicitors acting for an opposing party cannot realistically be founded on negligence where no duty of care is owed to the claimant as a non-client. An allegation that solicitors participated in fraud requires evidence capable of establishing their knowledge of the alleged falsity; documents which do not support that inference provide no sufficient basis for the claim. Allegations of judicial bias require evidence of a legally relevant basis. A judge’s previous professional dealings with a solicitor’s firm, or the judge’s religion, race or political outlook, does not establish bias.

Mr Abbas brought proceedings against Hammond Suddards, the solicitors who had acted for Seer Technologies in earlier litigation against him. He alleged that the firm knew that an affidavit relied on to obtain a freezing order contained false statements. He claimed substantial damages for the consequences.

The freezing order was later lifted, and an inquiry into loss was directed. Mr Abbas’s claim in the Seer proceedings was subsequently struck out, save for an admitted sum. Jacob J struck out the claim against Hammond Suddards on 30 May 2002. Mr Abbas applied for permission to appeal, alleging that the claim disclosed fraud, and also complaining of judicial bias and inaccuracies in the judge’s background account. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal had any real prospect of success.

Application for permission to appeal refused.

1. The principal allegation was that Hammond Suddards knew that the part of Mr McKinnie’s affidavit concerning approximately $68,000 was false. Fraud carries a heavy burden of proof. The documents relied on by Mr Abbas, including the licence agreement, the letter of 23 December 1997 and the memorandum of the October 1996 meeting, did not establish or materially support an inference that the solicitors knew the affidavit was wrong.
2. The documents indicated that CBS could invoice Citibank, but also that Seer was entitled to receive the relevant amounts, less 20 per cent. They did not contradict the affidavit’s principal assertion that the funds should have been remitted to Seer. Any question whether the solicitors’ conduct might have been negligent was immaterial because Hammond Suddards owed no duty of care in negligence to Mr Abbas, who was not their client.
3. The complaints of bias had no evidential foundation. The fact that a judge had previously been instructed by a firm of solicitors was no basis for alleging bias. Allegations based on the judge’s supposed religion or political outlook were irrelevant to the judicial oath and impartiality.
4. Any alleged inaccuracies in Jacob J’s brief summary of the earlier Seer proceedings were background matters. They did not concern the crucial issues in the proposed appeal, so the Court of Appeal did not need to determine whether they were correct.
5. Although the freezing order and injunction had caused Mr Abbas substantial loss, the consequences arose within the Seer proceedings and did not provide a basis for the claim against Hammond Suddards. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The order was: application for permission to appeal refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the decision of Jacob J was refused.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: Jacob J struck out Mr Abbas’s claim against Hammond Suddards on 30 May 2002.