Dawkins v Dawkins

[2002] EWCA Civ 1229

Case details

Case citations
[2002] EWCA Civ 1229
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
22 July 2002
Judgment text

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Subjects
Family Ancillary relief Permission to appeal
Keywords
ancillary relief lump sum school fees final financial orders permission to appeal important point of law compelling reason stay of execution
Outcome
appeal dismissed; permission to appeal, extension of time and stay of execution refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Where an appeal has already been heard in the court of trial, permission to appeal requires an important point of law or principle, or another compelling reason. That threshold is high and is rarely met. Final financial orders will be reinvestigated only in the most exceptional circumstances. A party concerned about the use of a lump sum intended to meet education costs should seek appropriate payment or protective provisions when the order is made, or apply to vary the payment arrangements where the order permits.

Factual background

The applicant appealed in person against an order of His Honour Judge Brandt in ancillary relief proceedings. The Circuit Judge had reduced a lump-sum order from £35,000 to £20,000 and later extended the payment date. The applicant was concerned that the respondent might not apply the money to their son's school fees and relied on Barder v Caluori as supporting a further challenge to the order.

The application before the Court of Appeal sought permission to appeal, an extension of time and a stay of execution. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for permission was met and whether the case justified reopening a final financial order.

Held

  1. Permission to appeal. Because an appeal had already taken place in the court of trial, Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55 prevented permission being granted unless the application raised an important point of law or principle, or there was another compelling reason. This was a high hurdle and was not satisfied.
  2. Final financial orders. The circumstances did not approach those in Barder v Caluori [1998] AC 20. The principle stated by Lord Brandon was that the court would reinvestigate intended final orders only in the most exceptional cases. The present application did not meet that standard.
  3. Education costs. The lower court's order was founded on the expectation that the lump sum would relieve the applicant of further school-fee liability and that the respondent would finance the child's future private education, using her own resources if necessary. The applicant could apply to the judge for an arrangement securing payment of school fees by instalments or directly to the school. It was also open to him to seek appropriate relief if the respondent prematurely ended the agreed education on financial grounds.
  4. Disposition. The applications for permission to appeal, an extension of time and a stay of execution were all refused.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Applications for permission to appeal, an extension of time and a stay of execution refused.
  • Hertford County Court: His Honour Judge Brandt reduced the District Judge's lump-sum order from £35,000 to £20,000 and later extended the payment date.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal dismissed; permission to appeal, extension of time and stay of execution refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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