N W P Woodward v Inland Revenue

When permission to appeal is sought out of time, the court may consider both the explanation for delay and the apparent merits of the proposed appeal. The short time limit reflects a policy favouring expedition and finality. A trial judge has primary responsibility for deciding whether a trial can fairly proceed when an adjournment is sought. The Court of Appeal will not interfere where the judge has considered fairness to both parties. A litigant in person may be permitted to give oral evidence on matters raised in submissions, so that the evidence can be tested. Unofficial recording equipment may be used only with the court’s permission.

The claimant alleged that the Commissioners had negligently or maliciously pursued his bankruptcy in 1993 when the demanded tax was not due. Jacob J dismissed the damages claim after trial on 9 May 2001. The claimant filed his appellant’s notice about five and a half months late and sought an extension of time and permission to appeal.

His grounds included alleged medical inability to proceed, denial of a jury trial, admission of oral evidence, refusal of personal recording equipment, and breach of Article 6. The central questions were whether the delay should be excused and whether the proposed grounds disclosed an unfair trial or an arguable basis for appellate intervention.

Lord Justice Chadwick, sitting alone, refused both the extension of time and permission to appeal.

1. Extension of time. The appellant’s notice was filed about five months outside the period required by CPR 52.4(2). The explanations advanced, including difficulties obtaining transcripts, the claimant’s status as a litigant in person, pressure of work and medical problems, did not sufficiently explain the delay. The court was entitled to consider the underlying merits of the proposed appeal. The grounds alleging an unfair trial had little apparent merit. The short time limit reflected a policy favouring prompt challenges and finality.
2. Adjournment and fair trial. The decision whether to proceed with a trial when an adjournment is sought at its outset is particularly a matter for the trial judge, who is better placed to assess whether the case can fairly proceed. The judge must keep the overriding objective in view. If a fair trial becomes impossible, the judge can adjourn the proceedings or direct a new trial. There was no proper basis for appellate interference in this case, and no later event during the trial made continuation unfair.
3. Jury trial and evidence. Section 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was relevant to the claimant’s proposed transfer to the Queen’s Bench Division, but the transfer application had been made too late and the claim was arguably unsuitable for jury trial because of the likely examination of documents and accounts. The trial judge was also entitled to permit the claimant to give evidence on oath about factual matters raised in submissions. Excluding those matters could have been unfair to the claimant, while admitting them without cross-examination would have been unfair to the Commissioners.
4. Recording proceedings. The Practice Direction supplementing CPR Part 39 prohibited unofficial recording equipment without permission. That prohibition protected the authenticity of the court record. The refusal of personal recording equipment did not establish unfairness, particularly as the ordinary practice was to record proceedings on a master tape and make transcripts available through the proper procedure.

Order: permission to appeal refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 31 January 2002, the application for an extension of time and permission to appeal was refused.
• Chancery Division — Jacob J dismissed the claimant’s damages claim after trial by order dated 9 May 2001.
• High Court — On 15 June 1999, the Vice-Chancellor rescinded the bankruptcy order by consent and expressed no view on whether it should originally have been made.