Barnes v Handf Acceptances Ltd

On a second appeal, permission is available only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or where another compelling reason exists. A challenge to a case-management decision refusing an excessively long and complex amended pleading will not satisfy that threshold where the lower judge applied the correct principles. The proposed pleading may properly be refused where it would obstruct a fair, proportionate and expeditious trial. The existence of an existing viable claim does not require permission to challenge refusal of the amendment.

The applicant pursued a claim concerning finance provided for a property development. The county court refused permission to file extensive amended particulars of claim and entered summary judgment for the defendant on the mistaken basis that the original pleading was no longer relied upon.

On appeal, Hart J set aside the summary judgment because the original particulars disclosed a reasonable cause of action, but upheld the refusal of the proposed amendment. The applicant sought permission for a second appeal against that case-management decision. The issues were whether the statutory second-appeal threshold was met and whether there was any basis for interfering with the exercise of case-management discretion.

1. Application refused. The renewed application was for permission to bring a second appeal. Under CPR 52.13 and section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. The proposed appeal concerned refusal of permission to amend pleadings. That was essentially a case-management decision concerning whether the claim was pleaded in a form capable of proceeding consistently with the overriding objective in CPR 1.1.
3. Hart J correctly held that the original pleading disclosed a reasonable cause of action and set aside the summary judgment entered on the contrary understanding. The applicant therefore retained a claim which could be pursued, subject to any amendment the county court might allow.
4. The proposed amendment was extraordinarily lengthy and complex. Its volume made a just trial practically impossible and was capable of amounting to an abuse of the court’s process or obstructing the just disposal of the proceedings. Hart J was entitled to refuse it as inconsistent with fairness, expedition and proportionality.
5. No important point of principle or practice, and no other compelling reason, had been identified. There was no prospect that the Court of Appeal would interfere with the discretionary case-management decision. There was no order for costs, and a transcript was directed to be supplied at public expense. Reinstatement could be sought if the applicant’s non-attendance were shown to be explicable and excusable.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The renewed application for permission to bring a second appeal was refused.
• High Court: Hart J set aside the county court’s summary judgment because the original pleading disclosed a reasonable cause of action, but upheld refusal of the proposed amended particulars. No citation is stated in the judgment.
• Lambeth County Court: The court refused the proposed amended particulars and entered summary judgment for the defendant under CPR Part 24.