Jackson v Qureshi

[2002] EWCA Civ 1286

Case details

Case citations
[2002] EWCA Civ 1286
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
29 August 2002
Judgment text

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Subjects
Civil procedure Appellate review Apportionment of liability
Keywords
permission to appeal real prospect of success witness evidence cross-examination medical condition credibility findings findings of fact apportionment of liability road traffic accident contributory negligence
Outcome
permission to appeal refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Distress experienced by a witness during cross-examination is not, without more, a ground for appellate intervention. The question is whether the circumstances impaired the evidence in a way that might have affected the outcome. An appellate court will generally respect the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses and findings of fact, particularly where supported by substantial evidence. Apportionment of liability is principally a matter of impression for the trial judge, and the Court of Appeal will seldom interfere absent a clear basis for doing so.

Factual background

The claimant sought permission to appeal from a Leeds County Court judgment concerning a road traffic accident in which she was seriously injured by the defendant’s taxi. The trial judge found both parties negligent and apportioned liability equally.

The claimant relied on her serious head injury and medical evidence, arguing that the late production of a police statement during cross-examination traumatised her and impaired her evidence. She also challenged the trial judge’s reliance on a witness, his finding that she had been walking briskly, and the 50/50 apportionment. The central issues were whether the trial had been unfair and whether there was any proper basis for appellate interference.

Held

  1. Permission to appeal refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The extension of time sought would have been granted only if permission to appeal had been appropriate.
  2. The claimant was understandably upset when the police statement was produced, but the transcript did not show that her evidence was impaired. The statement contradicted nothing material, did not undermine her credibility, and did not lead her to make damaging concessions. She continued to give a good account of herself. An adjournment had in fact been taken, and she did not ask for further time or seek to stop her evidence. Her counsel did not raise the issue with the trial judge after she had finished giving evidence.
  3. The trial judge was not shown to have acted unfairly by allowing the evidence to continue. The agreed medical report did not, without anything indicating actual impairment in court, require the judge to intervene or adjourn the trial.
  4. The challenges to the evidence of Mr Clare and to the finding that the claimant was walking briskly concerned credibility and findings of fact. The trial judge had seen and heard the witnesses, and there was a strong body of evidence supporting his conclusions. The Court of Appeal therefore had no proper basis to interfere.
  5. Apportionment of liability was a matter of impression for the experienced trial judge, based on all the evidence. The Court of Appeal seldom interfered with such an assessment and found no basis for doing so here.

The formal order was: permission to appeal refused.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused permission to appeal from the first-instance decision.
  2. Leeds County Court, Leeds District Registry: His Honour Judge Hawkesworth found both parties negligent in the road traffic accident and apportioned liability 50/50.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
permission to appeal refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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