Hardwick Nominees Limited v Nottingham City Council

On a second appeal, permission requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the case. A challenge confined to whether premises constitute one house or two is ordinarily a question of fact where the lower court has identified the correct legal principles. The significance of the property owner, the possibility of wider guidance, and the technical nature of the challenge do not convert that factual issue into a qualifying ground for a second appeal.

Hardwick Nominees owned two adjoining properties containing residential flats. Nottingham City Council treated them as one house in multiple occupation and served a fire-precaution notice under section 352 of the Housing Act 1985. The claimant appealed under section 353(2)(c), arguing that the properties were two houses and required separate notices. His Honour Judge Waine found that there was effectively one house and dismissed the appeal. Permission for a further appeal was refused on paper. The claimant renewed its application before the Court of Appeal, raising the question whether the dispute satisfied the second-appeal threshold.

Lord Justice Peter Gibson delivered the judgment of the court. Lord Justice Tuckey agreed. The application for permission to appeal was unanimously refused.

1. Applicable threshold. The proposed appeal was a second appeal because it arose from a county court decision made on appeal. Under CPR 52.13, permission could be granted only if the appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. Nature of the proposed appeal. The claimant was challenging the judge’s finding that the adjoining premises constituted one house rather than two. The judge had correctly identified the relevant legal principles. Whether there was one house or two was therefore a question of fact, not an important point of principle or practice.
3. Submissions about wider significance. The claimant relied on the definition of a house, its ownership of other properties, the consequences of a notice, and the desirability of guidance on valid notices. Those matters did not alter the essentially factual character of the proposed appeal.
4. Compelling reason. The point was technical. The claimant had conceded that, if separate notices had been served, the required works would have had to be carried out. No other compelling reason for hearing the appeal was advanced. The requirements of CPR 52.13 were consequently not met, and permission could not be given.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused under CPR 52.13.
• Mansfield County Court: On 13 May 2002, His Honour Judge Steven Waine dismissed the claimant’s appeal against Nottingham City Council’s notice.
• Permission stage: Sir Philip Otton refused permission on paper on the basis that the intended appeal was a second appeal.