Ayobioj v London Borough Of Camden

An appeal from an Employment Tribunal lies only on a question of law. The Court of Appeal will interfere with a discretionary case-management decision only for an error of principle or where the decision is plainly wrong because relevant matters were ignored, irrelevant matters considered, or the decision was misunderstood. An amendment should not be allowed to reintroduce allegations already struck out and whose exclusion has been upheld on appeal. Where a proposed appeal has no real prospect of success, permission should be refused.

The applicant, an employee of the respondent local authority, brought Employment Tribunal claims concerning sex discrimination, victimisation, harassment, constructive dismissal, unfair dismissal and race discrimination. The Employment Tribunal struck out the unfair-dismissal claim as out of time and parts of the discrimination and victimisation claims as misconceived.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the race-discrimination claim to proceed but dismissed the challenges to the strike-out decisions. The Employment Tribunal later refused permission to amend the claim, holding that the proposed amendment sought to reintroduce matters already excluded. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the further appeal, finding no arguable point of law. The applicant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the refusal of permission to amend disclosed a reviewable error.

1. Application refused. The Court proceeded in the applicant’s absence on the basis of the papers and concluded that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
2. An appeal from an Employment Tribunal is confined to questions of law. Where the challenged decision involves an exercise of discretion, the appellate court may intervene only if there has been an error of principle or the decision is plainly wrong because the decision-maker misunderstood the issue, took account of irrelevant matters, or failed to take account of relevant matters.
3. The Employment Tribunal chairman correctly characterised the proposed amendment as an attempt to circumvent the earlier Employment Appeal Tribunal decisions. Those decisions had upheld the exclusion of the relevant discrimination and victimisation allegations. It was therefore inappropriate to exercise the amendment discretion so as to reintroduce them into the proceedings.
4. The proposed amendment would have caused further delay in proceedings already significantly delayed, including proceedings requiring evidence about events occurring more than three years earlier. That case-management consideration reinforced the conclusion that the chairman’s decision fell within the permissible range and disclosed no error of principle.
5. The remaining race-discrimination claim should proceed as quickly as possible. Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused permission to appeal and directed that the remaining race-discrimination claim should proceed promptly.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Allowed the race-discrimination claim to proceed and remitted it to the Employment Tribunal, but dismissed the challenges to the earlier strike-out decisions. It later dismissed the appeal against refusal of permission to amend.
3. Employment Tribunal: Struck out the unfair-dismissal claim as out of time and parts of the discrimination and victimisation claims as misconceived. It later refused permission to amend the claim.