Humaidi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal is not granted merely because shortcomings in an adjudicator’s or tribunal’s reasoning have been identified. The question is whether there are reasonable prospects that the decision can be overturned on an error of law. Where the essential reasoning rejecting an asylum claim remains unaffected, and the identified defects do not alter the central factual assessment, permission may properly be refused. The absence of arrest, detention or questioning despite extensive alleged public political activity, together with the late issue of an arrest warrant on unspecified grounds, may materially undermine the asserted risk of persecution. The same evidential assessment may leave no factual basis for an Article 3 risk.

The applicant, a Yemeni national, appealed against refusal of his asylum and human-rights claims. An Adjudicator dismissed his appeal on 14 September 2001, finding him not credible and rejecting the evidential significance of an arrest warrant. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his further appeal on 7 March 2002.

The applicant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, relying on flaws concerning discrepancies in his account, the unchallenged authenticity of the warrant, and reliance on the timing of his asylum application. The central issue was whether those matters gave reasonable prospects of overturning the Tribunal’s decision, or required a fresh hearing.

Lord Justice Dyson gave the first judgment. Lady Justice Arden agreed with his reasons. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Permission threshold. Identifying shortcomings in the reasoning or approach of the Adjudicator and Tribunal did not itself establish reasonable prospects of overturning the decision on an error of law. The decisive question was whether the central reasoning and outcome remained open to challenge.
2. Credibility and evidential assessment. The Adjudicator’s reliance on a minor discrepancy concerning the applicant’s uncle was open to criticism. The Tribunal had also identified that the timing of the asylum application should not have been relied upon, and had inaccurately described part of the interview evidence. Nevertheless, other discrepancies and vagueness remained, including the contrast between alleged public meetings and meetings at a friend’s house, conflicting evidence about discussion of religion, and the vague account of joining and leaving the army.
3. Absence of expected official action. The essential reason for rejecting the asylum claim was that it was highly improbable that a person who had spoken at more than 80 public political meetings would not have been arrested, detained or questioned. The applicant had also not been arrested or detained during the 1995 incident involving two alleged army officers. That reasoning was materially unaffected by the identified defects.
4. Arrest warrant. The Tribunal was entitled to treat the warrant as weakening rather than strengthening the claim. It was issued more than eight months after the applicant had left Yemen, did not specify the grounds for arrest, might have related to army desertion, and had been sent by a person who had allegedly obtained a false supporting document for the applicant’s visa. The absence of a challenge to authenticity did not require the warrant to be accepted as convincing.
5. Human-rights claim. The same reasoning left no factual basis for concluding that the applicant faced a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Order: application refused. Community Legal Services funded assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused the application for permission to appeal on 7 October 2002.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 7 March 2002 against the Adjudicator’s decision.
• Adjudicator: dismissed the applicant’s appeal against refusal of his asylum and human-rights claims on 14 September 2001.