Howard v Ministry Of Defence

Under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, time is postponed only until the claimant discovers, or could with reasonable diligence discover, the facts relevant to the cause of action. Knowledge of the precise method of alleged concealment is unnecessary if the claimant already has sufficient material to support proceedings. Later documents that add no material support do not extend the limitation period. An appellate court will uphold a first-instance factual conclusion where the judge was entitled to reach it on the evidence.

The appellant was discharged from Royal Air Force service on medical grounds in 1974. In 1997 he brought claims for personal injury and economic loss, alleging inappropriate medical treatment and the recording and dissemination of a false diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. A High Court judge found both claims time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980. The appellant accepted the ruling on personal injury but appealed in respect of malicious falsehood.

The central issue was whether information disclosed by a psychiatrist in 1987, or at the latest 1988, gave the appellant sufficient knowledge to bring the malicious falsehood claim, or whether later medical records indicating alleged malice postponed limitation.

Disposition

Lord Justice Mantell delivered the judgment of the court. Lord Justice Rix agreed. The appeal was dismissed with costs, with liability to pay those costs adjourned generally.

1. The court treated the appeal as a challenge to the first-instance finding that the appellant had sufficient information by 1987, or at the latest 1988, to commence proceedings. The issue was therefore whether the judge was entitled to reach that factual conclusion on the available evidence.
2. Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 postpones the commencement of limitation where a relevant fact has been deliberately concealed, until the claimant discovers the concealment or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. The material question is knowledge of the facts necessary to support the cause of action.
3. The appellant argued that, although confusion and a wrong diagnosis might have been apparent in 1987, sufficient evidence of malice emerged only from later documents. The court rejected that submission. It found the later medical records added nothing materially significant to the information already available since 1987.
4. The first-instance judge had considered the documentary material and had the advantage of seeing and hearing the appellant give evidence and be cross-examined. On the evidence, he was entitled to find that the necessary facts were known by 1987 or 1988. The later discovery of the alleged method of concealment did not postpone limitation.
5. The personal injury limitation ruling was not challenged. The malicious falsehood appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the appeal against the limitation ruling, with costs directions as stated in the order.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Norwich District Registry: His Honour Judge Mellor, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, determined the limitation issue in favour of the Ministry of Defence. The appellant appealed only in relation to the malicious falsehood claim.
• Lowestoft County Court: Proceedings were issued and were subsequently transferred to the Norwich District Registry of the High Court.