Kent v Dethlefson

On a second-tier appeal, permission requires an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. The threshold is high. An application to annul a bankruptcy order cannot succeed merely by challenging the creditor’s honesty or the underlying judgment where the judgment remains unamended and establishes the debt. A judgment debt awarded to one person does not require a joint bankruptcy petition merely because the underlying dispute involved another person. Appellate intervention on an adjournment issue requires more than showing that an adjournment might have been granted; the refusal must have been such that the order should not have been made and an adjournment was the only reasonable course.

This was an application for permission to appeal from the judgment of Mr L Henderson QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division. The High Court had dismissed an appeal from Deputy Registrar Barnett’s refusal to annul a bankruptcy order made after a County Court judgment awarded £1,212 to the respondent and struck out the applicant’s claim. The applicant argued that the debt was owed jointly, that correspondence requesting an adjournment had not been considered, and that the respondent’s evidence was misleading. The central issues were whether the second-tier permission threshold was met and whether those matters gave a basis to annul the bankruptcy order.

Lord Justice Aldous dismissed the application.

1. Second-tier permission. Under rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, permission required an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. The requirement imposed a high standard. None of the three grounds advanced—allegedly misleading evidence, letters said to have been sent before the bankruptcy hearing, and the alleged need for joint petitioners—met that standard.
2. Annulment of the bankruptcy order. On the merits, an application to annul could succeed only if the applicant did not owe the debt or had paid it. Allegations concerning the respondent’s honesty, costs, or the amount claimed did not provide a basis to go behind the unamended County Court judgment.
3. Joint creditor argument. The bankruptcy petition was founded on the judgment debt. The judgment awarded the sum to the respondent alone. Accordingly, the fact that the underlying holiday dispute had involved her partner did not require a joint bankruptcy petition. The application would have failed on this point even without the second-tier restriction.
4. Adjournment. Assuming that the letters existed as described, the refusal of an adjournment remained a matter for the registrar’s discretion. A possible decision to grant a short adjournment was insufficient. The order could be disturbed only if it ought not to have been made and granting the adjournment was the only reasonable course. The High Court judge was right to reject the challenge.

Permission to appeal was refused. A copy of the judgment was ordered to be supplied to the applicant at public expense.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused, and the application was dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: On 12 July 2002, Mr L Henderson QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, dismissed the appeal from the refusal to annul the bankruptcy order.
• Bankruptcy proceedings: Deputy Registrar Nicholls made the bankruptcy order on 12 February 2002. Deputy Registrar Barnett dismissed the subsequent application for annulment on 19 April 2002.
• Cambridge County Court: Judgment was entered for the respondent for £1,212, and the applicant’s claim was struck out.