Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd

An application for permission to appeal will be refused where the applicant has already obtained the practical relief sought and there is no arguable error in the order challenged. A time limit under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 cannot be invoked prematurely where the relevant substantive decision has not yet been made. An appeal from an Employment Appeal Tribunal decision is governed by the specific appellate procedure and time limits applicable to that appeal.

The applicant had brought proceedings concerning alleged victimisation by his former employer. The Employment Tribunal declined jurisdiction, relying on Post Office v Adekeye. His appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was listed for hearing.

Before that hearing, he objected to the respondent’s leading counsel appearing because counsel was also a part-time Employment Appeal Tribunal judge. The Employment Appeal Tribunal adjourned the appeal and directed that the future panel should, if possible, exclude lay members who had previously sat on a panel presided over by that counsel. The applicant sought permission to appeal against that order and raised a further issue concerning the time limit under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1. Application refused. The applicant had obtained all the legitimate practical relief available on the alleged panel-impartiality issue. The adjourned appeal was to be heard by a panel excluding lay members who had sat with the respondent’s counsel. There was therefore no realistic basis for a successful appeal against the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s order.

2. The court proceeded, solely for the purpose of the application, on the assumption that one of the lay members had previously sat on a panel presided over by the respondent’s counsel. That assumption did not alter the conclusion, because the Employment Appeal Tribunal had already made arrangements addressing the concern.

3. The applicant’s reliance on section 7(5)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 was misconceived. The Employment Appeal Tribunal had not yet made its substantive decision on the merits of the underlying appeal. Accordingly, no one-year period relating to that substantive decision had begun to run.

4. Any challenge to a substantive Employment Appeal Tribunal decision would proceed by the statutory right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, subject to the separate and substantially stricter applicable time limits. The Human Rights Act provisions did not replace that appellate procedure.

5. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission to appeal against the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s order dated 10 October 2001.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: adjourned the substantive appeal and directed that, if possible, the future panel should not include lay members who had previously sat on a panel presided over by the respondent’s counsel.
• Employment Tribunal, Sheffield: on 12 July 2000, concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s victimisation complaint.