Robinson v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions & Anor

In a statutory planning appeal, an error in a planning inspector’s report does not justify quashing the decision unless the error is materially capable of affecting the decision-maker’s planning judgment. Errors must be assessed cumulatively and against the report as a whole, including accompanying plans and photographs. A decision remains valid where the essential nature, location and planning context of the site are sufficiently clear despite inaccuracies. Planning judgments are evaluative, and an appellate court will not readily reopen factual findings or discretionary procedural decisions made by the lower court.

The claimant sought permission to appeal from the dismissal by His Honour Judge Rich QC, sitting in the Administrative Court, of his appeal under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288. The underlying challenge concerned the Secretary of State’s refusal of planning permission for a touring caravan site at Marton Hall, Bridlington, following a planning inspector’s report and public inquiry.

The claimant alleged that inaccuracies in the inspector’s description of the site and its surroundings had materially affected the Secretary of State’s decision. He also complained that the judge had curtailed his oral submissions and wrongly refused late evidence. The central issue was whether the alleged errors or procedural decisions provided a proper basis for quashing the planning decision.

Lord Justice Auld refused the renewed application for permission to appeal.

1. Fair hearing. The claimant had supplied comprehensive written skeleton arguments, which the judge had read and understood. The purpose of a skeleton argument is to avoid extended oral argument that merely repeats or unnecessarily elaborates upon its contents. There was no basis for concluding that the claimant had been denied a fair hearing.
2. Materiality of alleged errors. Errors in an inspector’s report must be considered cumulatively and in the context of the report as a whole, together with the plans and photographs accompanying it. They justify quashing only if they materially mislead the Secretary of State or cause the decision to rest on mistaken or immaterial considerations. The error placing the site west rather than east of Bridlington was a slip of the pen. The description of the site as a few metres from Marton Hall was loose, but the true position was apparent from the materials.
3. Late evidence and factual findings. The judge acted within his discretion in refusing late evidence about visibility from the nearby road, particularly because the Secretary of State had not been given notice to test it. His conclusion that the inspector’s account was not shown to be inaccurate was a finding of fact that could not properly be reopened on this appeal.
4. Planning judgment. The judge was entitled to construe the inspector’s reference to parkland in a practical rather than strictly historical sense. The site retained a setting with landscape quality and rural surroundings. Any inaccuracies were not sufficiently material to create a wrong overall impression or invalidate the Secretary of State’s planning judgment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal refused.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: His Honour Judge Rich QC dismissed the claimant’s appeal under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, against the Secretary of State’s refusal of planning permission.