Clarke v Taylor

Permission to appeal against a quantum assessment should be refused where the proposed grounds merely challenge findings of fact that were supported by the evidence and explained by clear, sustainable reasons. Particular restraint is required where the trial judge heard the relevant oral evidence. A judge may assess a business proposition independently where expert evidence does not answer the precise financial question, using the evidence available. A broad-brush approach may also be permissible for relatively minor calculations where it does not prevent justice being done. Thin evidence does not necessarily justify appellate intervention if the judge’s reasoning remains clear and sustainable.

The claimant, Darren Jonathan Clarke, brought a personal injury claim against Christine Taylor arising from a road traffic accident. Liability had previously been established on a full liability basis. On 31 July 2002, Andrew Smith J assessed damages at £622,462 inclusive of interest.

The defendant sought permission to appeal, arguing that the awards for loss of earnings, care, accommodation, vehicle expenses and other items lacked an adequate evidential basis. The principal challenge concerned the judge’s acceptance of the claimant’s and his wife’s evidence about the claimant’s pain and disability despite conflicting medical evidence. The central issue was whether the proposed grounds disclosed any realistic basis for appellate intervention.

Lord Justice Kay gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Dyson agreed. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Findings based on oral evidence. The trial judge was entitled to accept the claimant’s and his wife’s evidence about the extent and progression of his pain and disability. The judge had heard the witnesses and had carefully considered the medical evidence. The evidence relied on by the defendant did not make the findings unsustainable. The Court of Appeal, which had not heard the evidence, had no proper basis for displacing them.
2. Future loss of earnings. The judge was entitled to evaluate for himself whether the claimant was likely to obtain finance for suitable business premises. The expert evidence addressed a larger sum than the judge found necessary and therefore did not answer the precise question. The claimant’s evidence about his relationship with his bank, together with the judge’s assessment of the business proposal, provided an arguable evidential basis for the conclusion.
3. Minor calculations. In relation to relatively minor matters of calculation, the judge could adopt a broad-brush approach. The fact that some estimates favoured the defendant and others favoured the claimant did not show that justice had been denied.
4. Other grounds. Although the evidence on one matter was thin, the judge’s reasoning was clear and sustainable. No proposed ground disclosed a realistic prospect of appellate intervention. Permission was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The defendant’s application for permission to appeal against the quantum assessment was refused.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Andrew Smith J had entered judgment on liability on 22 May 2000 and assessed damages on 31 July 2002 at £622,462 inclusive of interest.