Mortgage Express v Pickup & Anor

On a renewed application for permission to appeal, the applicant must show an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for appellate intervention. A dispute about compensation intended to reduce mortgage arrears did not satisfy that threshold where the lower court had considered the relevant matters and no legal error or wider principle was identified. Where a possession warrant has probably already been executed, granting permission may also be practically pointless. Permission was therefore refused.

Mortgage Express obtained a suspended possession order against Mr and Mrs Pickup after mortgage arrears arose. Their later bankruptcy and an anticipated compensation payment from the Highways Agency led to repeated applications to suspend execution of the possession warrant. District Judge Ashton refused further suspension, and an earlier appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Appleton.

His Honour Judge Maddocks dismissed a further appeal on 20 August 2002 and refused permission to appeal. The Pickups renewed their application in the Court of Appeal and sought a stay of execution. The central issues were whether the compensation payment required further suspension of possession and whether the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason.

Disposition. The renewed application for permission to appeal and the associated application for a stay of execution were refused. Nobody attended the hearing. Lord Justice Longmore assumed that the possession warrant had been executed on or about 19 November 2002.

1. On a renewed permission application, the applicants had to show that the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or that there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The application disclosed neither.
2. The compensation claim did not provide a sufficient basis for permission. His Honour Judge Maddocks had rejected the suggestion that Mortgage Express was at fault for failing to obtain the compensation, since the claim was the Pickups’ and they had to procure payment. Although the compensation exceeded the arrears and could support an argument under Section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970, the lower court had been entitled to refuse further suspension after considering the relevant circumstances, including the applicants’ history of payments and their ability to meet future interest payments.
3. The Court of Appeal did not need to resolve finally the arguments about appropriation of the compensation towards capital, the addition of interest to arrears, or the mortgagee’s alleged failure to claim the compensation. Those matters did not establish an important point of principle, practice, or a compelling reason for an appeal.
4. If the eviction had already occurred, permission would in any event have been pointless. The formal order was: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 2 December 2002, Lord Justice Longmore refused the renewed application for permission to appeal and the associated stay application.
2. Liverpool County Court: His Honour Judge Maddocks dismissed the appeal on 20 August 2002 and refused permission to appeal.
3. County Court: District Judge Ashton refused further suspension of the possession warrant on 11 June 2002. His Honour Judge Appleton had dismissed an earlier appeal on 18 December 2001.