Sun Life Assurance Society Plc v Poole

A case-management decision to refuse an adjournment will be disturbed on appeal only where it was plainly wrong, including through failure to consider a relevant matter. A litigant’s disability and lack of representation require careful consideration, but do not themselves establish an unfair trial. The court is not under a legal duty to provide legal representation or a sighted reader where reasonable procedural assistance has been provided. Sections 22 and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 did not apply to proceedings enforcing a charge over property. The claimant’s payment under a guarantee created liability enforceable through the legal charge, and the proposed defences disclosed no real prospect of success.

Sun Life Assurance Society Plc sought repayment of money paid under a guarantee given to Lloyds and enforcement of a legal charge over property charged by Frederick Thomas Poole. Etherton J refused an adjournment and subsequently gave judgment for Sun Life in the sum of £136,500 and interest. Poole, who was blind from birth and unrepresented, sought permission to appeal against both orders.

He relied principally on alleged procedural unfairness, the pending Jaffray litigation, disability discrimination, fraud, non-disclosure, breach of statutory duty, absence of a certificate under the guarantee and misrepresentation. The central issues were whether either appeal had a real prospect of success and whether the trial had been unfair.

1. Permission refused. The applications against both the refusal to adjourn and the judgment for Sun Life were dismissed. There was no real prospect of either appeal succeeding.
2. The decision whether to adjourn was a case-management discretion. The Court of Appeal would interfere only if the judge’s decision was plainly wrong, for example because relevant matters had been ignored or irrelevant matters taken into account. Etherton J had considered Poole’s blindness, lack of representation, the pending litigation and the possibility that an adjournment would improve his position. His decision was therefore not open to appellate intervention.
3. The court had taken reasonable steps to assist Poole. Relevant judgments and the full hearing transcript had been translated into braille. Etherton J had explored legal aid, the Bar pro bono scheme, the Official Solicitor and other possible sources of assistance. The court was under no legal duty to provide representation or a competent sighted reader. The trial was fair, notwithstanding the disadvantage caused by Poole’s disability.
4. The alleged disability discrimination claims were misconceived. Sections 22 and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 did not apply to proceedings of this kind, involving enforcement of a charge over premises. There was also no evidence that Sun Life had treated comparable individuals more favourably.
5. Etherton J was right on the substantive defences. The alleged fraud known to Sun Life was unsupported by more than allegations; the certificate point was misconceived; non-disclosure and breach of statutory duty were excluded by Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd v Qureshi [1999] 2 All ER 707; and any misrepresentations by Grimston Scott did not bind Sun Life because the advisers acted as Poole’s principals, not as Sun Life’s agents.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against two orders of Etherton J was refused. The order was recorded as “Application dismissed”.
• High Court: Etherton J refused an adjournment of the trial and later gave judgment for Sun Life for £136,500 and interest. The citation of those orders was not stated in the judgment.