H (A Child)

An interim care hearing must remain confined to protecting the child until the court can conduct the essential final hearing. It must not determine long-term parenting capacity prematurely. Separation from parents with whom the child has always lived is justified at the interim stage only where the child’s immediate safety demands it.

Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention require the court to avoid a premature and disproportionate determination of the parents’ long-term case unless the child’s welfare requires that course. Risks must be established by sufficient evidence and assessed cumulatively against the harm and potential instability caused by removal.

A local authority obtained an interim care order shortly after B’s birth, but B continued living with his parents in residential assessment units. Following a crisis in the parents’ relationship, the authority changed its plan from rehabilitation to removal. The parents subsequently continued to care for B successfully, although recommended psychotherapy had not been made available to the mother.

His Honour Judge Corrie, sitting in the Northampton County Court, accepted the local authority’s case and authorised B’s removal when the residential unit closed. The mother appealed. The central issue was whether B’s safety during the four months before the final hearing required immediate separation, or whether the interim decision had prematurely determined the parents’ long-term case.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Thorpe LJ delivered the judgment, with which Lawrence Collins J agreed.

1. The purpose and limits of an interim hearing had to be respected. The parents’ long-term ability to care for B required a full and profound trial. The interim hearing could control the period before that trial, but could not usurp or replace it.

2. The expert evidence invited a present conclusion about the parents’ long-term prospects. By accepting that evidence, the judge had been drawn beyond the proper boundaries of the interim hearing. Although the judge suggested that the parents’ case could still be fully determined later, an order separating B from them would realistically have been largely determinative of their long-term case.

3. The parents’ rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention required the court to abstain from prematurely determining their future case unless the child’s welfare demanded otherwise. Removal from the only parents with whom B had lived would be deeply traumatic and might cause further disruption if the parents ultimately succeeded. Separation could therefore be contemplated only if B’s immediate safety required it.

4. The evidence did not establish that necessity. The suggested risks comprised possible physical crossfire between the parents, emotional harm from their unstable relationship, and the father’s occasional irritation with B. Those matters, individually and cumulatively, were insufficient when measured against the parents’ acknowledged record of excellent care before and after the relationship crisis.

5. The systemic failure to provide the mother with identified psychotherapy was also troubling. The court directed that she could release relevant documents to a jointly instructed consultant adult psychiatrist and urged renewed efforts to secure appropriate treatment before the final hearing.

The judge’s decision was reversed. B was to remain with his parents until the final hearing or further interim order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed. The order authorising B’s removal was reversed, and B was to remain with his parents until the final hearing or further order.
• Northampton County Court: His Honour Judge Corrie accepted the local authority’s case and sanctioned B’s removal from his parents when the residential assessment unit closed.