Sparks v HSBC Plc

In a psychiatric-injury claim, the relevant question is whether the defendant’s negligence caused or materially contributed to a recognised illness, including an appreciable or measurable acceleration or exacerbation. It is unnecessary to prove that the negligence caused the claimant’s loss of employment if other recoverable damage is established. However, speculative or minimal medical evidence will not suffice. An appellate court should respect a trial judge’s evaluation of evidence in its factual context, particularly where the judge heard the witnesses and experts. A finding that the negligent conduct caused no appreciable or measurable worsening is a finding of fact which will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal.

The claimant, an employee of the respondent bank, appealed against the dismissal of his claim for damages by His Honour Judge Barclay in the Bristol County Court on 17 July 2001. The judge had found that the bank was negligent in exposing the claimant, who was known to be vulnerable and suffering from depression, to additional responsibility and inadequate support during the final weeks of his employment.

The judge also found that the claimant’s depressive illness had resulted from work-related pressure, but concluded that the negligence in the final period had not caused his loss of employment or any appreciable recoverable exacerbation of the illness. Permission to appeal was granted on causation only. The central issue was whether the negligence caused or materially contributed to a recognised psychiatric illness, or to its acceleration or exacerbation.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court accepted that the correct legal question was whether the negligence caused or materially contributed to any recoverable damage, rather than whether it caused the claimant to lose his job.
2. The trial judge was nevertheless entitled to conclude that the evidence did not establish that the negligent conduct caused or materially contributed to an appreciable or measurable exacerbation of the claimant’s depressive illness. The illness had been developing for some months and, on the evidence, the eventual outcome was inevitable. The late medical evidence that the events might have made matters worse or brought the outcome forward by a few days did not require a finding of legally recoverable damage.
3. The distinction between liability and quantum did not alter the causation requirement. Any acceleration or exacerbation relied upon had to be proved as damage capable of attracting an award, rather than inferred from the fact that the conduct was likely to have been unhelpful.
4. The Court of Appeal would not interfere with the judge’s evaluation of the expert and factual evidence. Judgments and evidence should be understood in their factual context, and appellate review should not treat a transcript as if it were a statute.
5. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The stay order made by the judge on costs was set aside.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from the Bristol County Court was dismissed with costs, and the stay order on costs was set aside.
• Bristol County Court: His Honour Judge Barclay dismissed the claimant’s damages claim on 17 July 2001.