Slaven v Greenwood Nursery (a firm)

When deciding whether to extend the limitation period under Limitation Act 1980, section 33, the court must consider all the circumstances and the particular factors listed in section 33(3)(a)–(f). Those circumstances may properly include the apparent strength of the claim on the evidence available at the hearing, as well as the prejudice caused by losing the limitation defence. The weight given to each factor is a matter for the first-instance judge. An appellate court should not interfere unless the judge erred in principle or reached a conclusion outside the proper range of discretion.

The claimant sought damages from his former employers for alleged work-related back injuries. He issued proceedings on 28 June 2001. A preliminary decision had found that he possessed the relevant knowledge for the purposes of sections 11 and 12 of the Limitation Act 1980 substantially before June 1998.

The District Judge then considered whether to disapply the limitation period under section 33(3). He declined to extend time, taking account of delay, the medical and engineering evidence, and the competing prejudice to the parties. The claimant appealed, alleging misdirection and excessive weight being given to the defendants’ loss of the limitation defence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge had properly approached the application under section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 by considering all the circumstances and the factors in paragraphs (a)–(f).
2. The complaint that the judge had treated pre-expiry delay as relevant under section 33(3)(a) was rejected. Read in context, the challenged passage recorded the defendants’ submissions rather than stating the judge’s own legal direction. Given the earlier finding on knowledge, there was no issue requiring a fresh determination of the extent of delay for paragraph (a).
3. The judge was entitled to consider the apparent strength of the claim on the engineering and medical evidence. He was not required to speculate about a possible further inspection or report which had not been produced, nor had an adjournment been sought for that purpose.
4. The balance of prejudice was for the District Judge to assess. The defendants’ loss of the limitation defence and the claimant’s loss of a potential claim were relevant competing considerations. The appellate court could not substitute its own assessment merely because different weight might have been given to particular matters.
5. There was no sufficient basis for concluding that the District Judge had misdirected himself or overlooked material matters. The appeal was dismissed, with costs payable by the claimant, subject to the stated set-off and postponement of assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the decision of District Judge McCullagh dismissed.
• Birkenhead County Court: On 4 April 2002, the District Judge declined to extend time under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
• Earlier preliminary hearing: His Honour Judge Morgan determined that the claimant had acquired the relevant knowledge for sections 11 and 12 of the Limitation Act 1980 well before 28 June 1998, probably during 1996.