Beat v Gopee & Ors

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success. Multiple applications and extensive allegations do not improve an appeal that has no realistic basis. Where property was registered in a bankrupt’s name, it vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, who could sell it for the benefit of creditors. A transfer to the bankrupt’s spouse may be set aside as a transaction at undervalue under Insolvency Act 1986, section 339. Applicants must show a realistic prospect of establishing a proprietary or beneficial interest before permission will be granted.

The applications arose from bankruptcy proceedings concerning 135 Elmcroft Avenue. Mr Gopee had been adjudicated bankrupt, and Mr Beat was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The High Court set aside a transfer of the property to Mrs Gopee, vested the property in the trustee, removed a stay of possession, vacated a company charge, rejected alleged beneficial interests, made a Grepe v Loam order against Mr Gopee, and ordered rectification of the land register after the trustee sold the property to Mr Hussain.

Mr and Mrs Gopee and several associated companies sought permission to appeal those orders, alleging procedural unfairness, fraud, conspiracy, perjury, separate corporate ownership and breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1. All applications refused. The court was required to decide whether the proposed appeals had a real prospect of succeeding.
2. The multiplicity of applications did not alter the substance of the dispute. The documents showed that Mr Gopee was the registered proprietor of 135 Elmcroft Avenue. On his bankruptcy, the property vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, who had power to sell it to pay creditors.
3. The transfer to Mrs Gopee was properly set aside under section 339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The appeal against that decision had already failed, and there was no realistic prospect of disturbing the conclusions reached by Pumphrey J concerning any alleged beneficial interest.
4. The companies’ claims also had no real prospect of success. On the evidence, the companies did not appear independent of Mr Gopee or his family, and the conclusions reached by Pumphrey J concerning them should stand.
5. The allegations concerning unfair trial, criminal conduct, corporate separateness and the Human Rights Act 1998 did not disclose a realistic basis for appeal. The applications, including those by Reddy Corporation Limited and the applications to join, were therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused all applications for permission to appeal on 8 February 2002.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Pumphrey J made orders on 6 December 1999, 4 April 2000 and 2 October 2001 concerning the property, alleged interests, company claims and rectification of the register. Ferris J had dismissed an earlier appeal against the Registrar’s order setting aside the transfer to Mrs Gopee.