Re B (A Child)

During an interim care order, the court’s power under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 is broad. It may direct any arrangement that is appropriate for obtaining information needed to decide whether a final care order should be made. That power may include directing that a child and parent reside together in an assessment centre, notwithstanding the local authority’s general control over a child in interim care. The court need not show that the proposed arrangement is essential. It is enough that the arrangement is appropriate and materially assists the assessment process.

The parents appealed against an interim care order made by His Honour Judge Tyrer. The order placed their newborn child in the interim care of the local authority and contemplated separation from the mother, while directing further assessments by the Legard Family Support Centre and the Portman Clinic.

The judge considered that, once the interim care order was made, he could not direct the local authority to place the child with the mother at Beacon Lodge. The parents argued that such a direction was authorised by section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989. The local authority relied on its statutory control over children in interim care. The central issue was whether residence at Beacon Lodge could be directed as part of the assessment arrangements.

The appeal was allowed. A direction was added requiring the child and mother to reside at Beacon Lodge pending the further hearing before Kirkwood J. The order was made with costs subject to public funding assessment.

1. Lord Justice Thorpe held that section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 authorised the direction. The provision empowered the court to give directions that it considered appropriate concerning the assessment. It was not necessary to establish that residence at Beacon Lodge was an essential element of the assessment.

2. The direction was appropriate because it formed part of simultaneous assessments intended to inform the court’s eventual decision on the child’s future. Beacon Lodge was an assessment centre with resources to assess both the mother’s parenting capacity and the attachment between mother and child. Residence there would also assist the work of the Legard Centre and the other professionals.

3. The local authority’s general control under an interim care order did not prevent the court from exercising the specific power in section 38(6). The court therefore was not constrained to accept the local authority’s decision to separate mother and child.

4. Lord Justice Buxton agreed. Adopting the purposive approach described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Re C (A Minor) (Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment) [1997] AC 489, he held that section 38(6) existed to enable the court to obtain information necessary for its own decision. The power was broad and generous. Residence at Beacon Lodge was both appropriate and an important part of the ordered assessment.

5. The observations concerning Re G (Minors) (Interim Care Order) [1993] 2 FLR 839 did not require determination. Lord Justice Thorpe stated that the proposition relied on from that decision appeared difficult to substantiate in light of the statutory scheme and Re C.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from the interim care order made by His Honour Judge Tyrer was allowed. The order was supplemented by a direction for residential assessment at Beacon Lodge pending the hearing before Kirkwood J.