Roshdi v Thames Trains Ltd & Anor

An appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s refusal to adjourn unless the judge misdirected himself in law or acted outside the broad ambit of his discretion. In deciding whether to adjourn, the judge must balance the interests of justice, including the litigant’s ability to present the case, the age and readiness of the evidence, attendance of witnesses, the importance of maintaining the trial date and relevant costs consequences. Sympathy for a litigant who unexpectedly loses legal representation does not require an adjournment where the judge has fairly assessed the material available at the time. The appellate court must not second-guess that evaluative decision merely because it might have exercised the discretion differently.

The claimant brought a personal injury action against Thames Trains Ltd and Railtrack plc arising from an alleged accident at Paddington Station in 1996. The trial was listed for two days and had already been adjourned once. Shortly before trial, the claimant’s application to extend the scope of her legal aid certificate was refused. Her solicitors obtained an order under CPR 42.3(1) that they had ceased to act, and the claimant then applied in person for an adjournment.

His Honour Judge Levy QC refused the adjournment, allowed a short preparation period, heard the claimant’s evidence and dismissed the claim on a submission that there was no case to answer. The claimant appealed against the refusal to adjourn. The central issue was whether the judge’s discretionary decision was one with which the Court of Appeal could properly interfere.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held unanimously that the refusal of an adjournment was within the judge’s discretion.
2. Under CPR 3.1(2)(b), read with the overriding objective in CPR 1.1, the trial judge had to balance all countervailing considerations. These included the claimant’s sudden loss of professional representation, the fact that witnesses were present, the age of the accident, the preparation already undertaken, the importance of preserving the trial date and the likely costs consequences of an adjournment.
3. The applicable appellate test was one of restraint. The court would interfere only if the judge misdirected himself in law or was clearly wrong because he had acted outside the ambit of the discretion entrusted to him. It was insufficient that another judge might have made a different order.
4. The judge was entitled to consider the practical consequences of an adjournment and could not be expected to know matters which were not apparent when the application was decided. It was also proper to take account of the uncertain prospect of recovering wasted costs from the claimant’s former solicitors.
5. Lord Justice Sedley expressed reservations about the claimant having to proceed without representation. He observed that the later conduct of the liability hearing might raise questions concerning the use of medical evidence and the solicitors’ late assessment of the merits, but those matters could not logically undermine the earlier discretionary refusal. The Court of Appeal declined to determine the merits of the underlying personal injury claim.
6. The appeal was dismissed with costs assessed at £2,250. Public funding assessment of the appellant’s costs was ordered, and permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Levy QC in the Central London County Court refusing an adjournment of the trial. Appeal dismissed; costs assessed at £2,250. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused.