Sherrocks v Sherrocks

On a second appeal, permission requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. A complaint that merely challenges factual findings or the exercise of discretion will not normally satisfy that threshold.

In ancillary relief proceedings, the duty to consider a clean break is distinct from, but complementary to, orders for property adjustment and periodical payments. The prospective absence of maintenance may properly be reflected in the allocation of capital.

The husband sought permission to appeal from an order made by His Honour Judge Catlin in ancillary relief proceedings arising from divorce proceedings. The circuit judge had allowed both parties’ appeals from a district judge’s order, set aside periodical payments, and adjusted the division of the wife’s equitable share in the matrimonial home to reflect a clean break.

The husband challenged the capital division, the assessment and investigation of his income, the conduct and timing of the sale, and the refusal to adjourn after he became ill during the circuit judge’s hearing. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal met the statutory and procedural criteria for a second appeal.

1. Application refused. The husband’s proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and raised neither an important point of principle or practice nor any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. Under rule 52.13(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, reflecting section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, the opportunity for a second appeal is substantially restricted. The provision guards against delay, abuse of process and disproportionate use of judicial resources.
3. The circuit judge was under a duty under section 25A(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to consider whether a clean break was appropriate. Property adjustment and financial provision are complementary. The absence, or likely future absence, of reliable periodical payments could properly be reflected by awarding the wife a greater proportion of her share of the matrimonial home.
4. The circuit judge was entitled to decline to reinvestigate the husband’s income where relevant documents were unavailable and his financial disclosure had been found unreliable. The decision was within the discretion recognised in G (formerly P) v P [1977] 1 WLR 1376.
5. The husband’s complaints about hidden assets, accommodation needs, sale arrangements and factual findings could not properly be revisited on this application. Nor was the refusal to adjourn rendered erroneous by his illness: no further oral evidence was to be received, and it was practicable to conclude the hearing.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the circuit judge’s order dated 27 June 2001 was refused.
• Uxb​ridge County Court, circuit judge: Appeals from the district judge were allowed; the district judge’s order was set aside; periodical payments were discharged and the capital division was varied.
• U​xbridge County Court, district judge: Ancillary relief orders were made, including periodical payments and division of the wife’s equitable share in the matrimonial home.