Hancock v Woods

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal depends on evidence that could have been adduced at trial but was not. The Court of Appeal will not ordinarily admit such evidence unless the requirements identified in Ladd v Marshall are satisfied. Findings of fact based on the evidence available at trial will not be disturbed where they are unassailable. Nor will permission be granted merely to challenge a judge’s discretionary refusal to alter registered titles where no proper basis for intervention is shown.

Mr Hancock applied for permission to reinstate an application and, if reinstated, for permission to appeal against an order of His Honour Judge Moseley QC dismissing his claim for rectification of the registers of title relating to 20 and 20A Beaufort Street, Brynmawr.

The trial judge had found that the parties intended Mr Hancock to receive only 20A, leaving 20 in Ms Woods’s ownership. Mr Hancock sought to rely on further valuation evidence suggesting that 20A was worth substantially less than the valuation used at trial. The central issue was whether that evidence could justify permission to appeal despite its omission at trial.

1. Application dismissed. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
2. Mr Hancock’s sole proposed ground depended on fresh valuation evidence which had not been adduced at trial. No satisfactory reason was given for that omission. The issue of valuation had been squarely before the trial judge, who reached findings of fact on the evidence available to him.
3. The requirements governing the admission of fresh evidence on appeal, identified in Ladd v Marshall, could not be satisfied. The proposed evidence therefore provided no proper basis for reopening or undermining the trial judge’s findings.
4. The findings as to the parties’ intentions were unassailable in the Court of Appeal. The judge had concluded that Mr Hancock was intended to take only Blewitt House, namely 20A, and that the existing registered titles reflected the true ownership position.
5. No basis existed for challenging the judge’s exercise of discretion in declining to alter the registered titles. Permission to appeal was accordingly refused and the application was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Application for permission to reinstate, with permission to appeal to follow if reinstatement were granted, dismissed. The court upheld the practical effect of the order made below by refusing permission because the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
• County Court: His Honour Judge Moseley QC dismissed Mr Hancock’s claim for rectification of the registered titles on 1 March 2001.