Laidler v New College Durham

An extension of time to seek permission to appeal should not ordinarily be refused solely because a litigant in person has missed the time limit. The court must nevertheless consider the substance of the proposed appeal. Where the underlying appeal has no legitimate basis and could not possibly succeed, the extension may be refused. The application for permission then falls away. Alleged privacy and disclosure defects do not justify appellate intervention where the trial disclosed no deficiency warranting criticism.

The claimant, a lecturer in psychology, brought an employment-related claim for psychiatric illness, alleging victimisation and mishandling of damage to his room and property. His claim was dismissed by His Honour Judge Walton on 29 January 2001. He sought an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal that decision and two pre-trial directions orders made on 8 September and 17 November 2000.

He relied on alleged privacy breaches concerning counselling records and inadequate disclosure. He accepted that, under section 9(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, an appeal was the route for raising those complaints. The central issue was whether time should be extended despite the absence of a viable underlying appeal.

The Court of Appeal, constituted by Lord Justice Latham, refused the application for an extension of time. The applications for permission to appeal therefore fell away.

1. The court considered the proposed complaints about counselling records, privacy and disclosure. The records were relevant to the psychiatric claim, and some material had been disclosed late, but the material did not establish a deficiency in the trial process.
2. The trial judge had heard the evidence carefully. He was entitled to approach the claimant’s evidence with caution, to prefer other witnesses where appropriate, and to conclude that the defendant had not victimised the claimant or breached its duties concerning the works and damage to property.
3. The judgment below was full and sympathetic and could not properly be criticised in a way capable of justifying appellate interference. The court therefore concluded that the claimant could not possibly succeed in an appeal and that the underlying applications had no merit.
4. Although the court would ordinarily be slow to shut out a litigant in person merely for failing to comply with a time limit, that procedural consideration could not justify an extension where there was no legitimate basis for an appeal.
5. Section 9(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 made an appeal the route for raising alleged Convention breaches arising from the proceedings. It did not provide a reason to extend time in an otherwise meritless case.

Order: Application refused.

• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Walton dismissed the claim on 29 January 2001 and had made pre-trial directions orders on 8 September and 17 November 2000.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for an extension of time to seek permission to appeal was refused. The permission applications consequently did not proceed.