Infante v Infante

Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 restricts appeals to the Court of Appeal from a county court decision made on appeal. Permission may be granted only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.

The statutory restriction applies even in an unusual and unsatisfactory case. The fact that a final ancillary-relief order was made without hearing one party’s evidence did not, after a full review by the circuit judge, justify permission.

Mr Antonio Infante sought permission to appeal against a county court ancillary-relief decision. The district judge refused an adjournment sought because Mr Infante was committed to coaching young footballers, and proceeded with the trial in his absence, although he was represented by counsel. The resulting order awarded the final matrimonial home to his former wife.

Mr Infante appealed to the circuit judge. Her Honour Judge McKinney dismissed the earlier adjournment appeal, and His Honour Judge Bond later dismissed the appeal against the ancillary-relief order. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the statutory conditions for a further appeal under section 55 were met.

1. Permission to appeal was refused. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 provides that, where an appeal has been made to a county court and that court has decided the matter on appeal, no further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal unless the Court considers that the proposed appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or that there is some other compelling reason to hear it.
2. Lord Justice Thorpe emphasised the plain legislative intention that the Court of Appeal should not entertain county-court appeals which have already undergone a full review by a circuit judge. The statutory gateway therefore applies notwithstanding the court’s sympathy for the applicant or concern about the case’s circumstances.
3. The case was unusual and unsatisfactory because the final order was made without hearing Mr Infante personally. The court recognised the force of his complaint. Nevertheless, that circumstance did not make it right in principle to grant permission. The circuit judge had reviewed the outcome, and the statutory threshold for a further appeal was not satisfied.
4. The formal order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Thorpe refused permission to appeal under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999.
• Bournemouth County Court, circuit judge: His Honour Judge Bond dismissed Mr Infante’s appeal against the ancillary-relief order. The earlier appeal concerning the adjournment had also been dismissed.
• Bournemouth County Court, district judge: The adjournment application was refused, and the ancillary-relief trial proceeded in Mr Infante’s absence, resulting in an order concerning the matrimonial home.