Tran v Greenwich Vietnam Community Project

A challenge to an employment tribunal’s failure to give adequate reasons must be raised squarely in the grounds of appeal. A party cannot introduce it as a challenge that the tribunal failed to consider particular issues, because the two grounds are materially different.

When requested, a tribunal must explain how its factual findings led to its conclusions. Reciting the background and submissions, announcing conclusions and referring opaquely to unspecified evidence will not suffice.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s power under section 35 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 does not permit it to remit a case for fuller reasons while retaining the appeal. The majority held that remission is available only when disposing of the appeal, ordinarily after allowing it.

The appellant had worked for a small charitable project for more than ten years. Its entire management committee investigated allegations of misconduct, subsequently adjudicated upon them and dismissed him. No internal appeal was available.

The Employment Tribunal dismissed his unfair dismissal claim. Its extended reasons concluded that the employer had undertaken a sufficient investigation, reasonably believed that misconduct had occurred and imposed an appropriate sanction. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed an appeal, holding that the decision was sufficiently informative under Meek v City of Birmingham [1987] IRLR 250.

Before the Court of Appeal, the principal complaint was that the Employment Tribunal had failed to give adequate reasons. The central issue was whether that complaint had been raised by the grounds presented to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and, if not, whether it could nevertheless be pursued in the Court of Appeal.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The grounds lodged before the Employment Appeal Tribunal did not include a challenge to the adequacy of the Employment Tribunal’s reasons. They alleged failures to consider specified issues and errors concerning the employer’s reasoning. A reasons challenge could not fairly be introduced by construing those grounds expansively, particularly without an application to amend and consideration of prejudice to the respondent.

2. Per Sedley LJ, with whom Brooke LJ agreed, once permission is granted for a second appeal in an employment case, scrutiny is directed to the Employment Tribunal’s decision rather than merely to the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision. That principle did not permit the appellant to bypass the absence of his principal complaint from the grounds of appeal below.

3. On the grounds that were properly available, the findings of procedural and substantive fairness were neither legally erroneous nor perverse. The use of the whole management committee as investigator and adjudicator, without an appeal, required cogent justification. Nevertheless, evidence about the organisation’s small size, lack of contractual procedures and wish to avoid factions provided material capable of supporting the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion. There was also evidential material upon which it could find a reasonable belief in misconduct, based on reasonable grounds after sufficient investigation.

4. The court made clear that the extended reasons were inadequate, although that issue could not determine the appeal. A tribunal asked to give reasons must explain how it moved from its factual findings to its conclusions. A recital of the background and submissions followed by an unexplained conclusion does not satisfy that obligation. Nor does an opaque reference to evidence. Arden LJ added that reasons may be terse or incorporate an identified document, but the requisite findings and reasoning should ordinarily be apparent from the decision and sufficiently clear to the parties and an appellate court.

5. By a majority, Arden and Brooke LJJ held that section 35 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 permits remission only for the purpose of finally disposing of an appeal. It does not authorise the Employment Appeal Tribunal to remit for amplified reasons while retaining the appeal. Sedley LJ would have construed the power as available at any appropriate stage, although he considered that remission merely to improve challenged reasons should rarely, if ever, occur.

6. The Employment Tribunal’s review power under rule 11 of Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution etc) Regulations 1993 concerns retaking the decision. It does not authorise revision or amplification of the reasons alone.

1. Court of Appeal: The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The court held that the adequacy-of-reasons challenge had not been raised before the Employment Appeal Tribunal and could not be introduced in this appeal.

2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: On 5 April 2001 the tribunal dismissed the appeal. It held that the procedural findings were sustainable and that the Employment Tribunal’s reasons did not contravene the principles in Meek v City of Birmingham [1987] IRLR 250. Its judgment was sent to the parties on 10 July 2001.

3. Employment Tribunal: Following hearings in April and September 1999, the tribunal dismissed the unfair dismissal application on 4 October 1999. Extended reasons were issued in December 1999.