Miah v Secretary of State for Social Security

Entitlement under section 73(1)(d) of the Social Security Contributions & Benefits Act 1992 requires evidence addressing the specific ability to use unfamiliar outdoor routes without guidance or supervision.

A tribunal may draw reasonable inferences from evidence, but it must not speculate about answers to relevant questions that were never asked, particularly where medical opinion is involved. A general statement that a claimant can walk outdoors without another person’s help does not establish that he can manage unfamiliar routes. The absence of a medicine from a report recording current prescriptions does not, without more, prove that the medicine is no longer used or needed.

The appellant had received a life award of the lower-rate mobility component of disability living allowance from 1995, based principally on visual impairment. Following an inquiry about whether diabetes affected his entitlement, the matter was reviewed. Adjudication officers concluded that the statutory conditions were no longer satisfied, and the Birmingham Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal on 4 April 2000.

Commissioner Jacobs upheld that decision and refused leave to appeal. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the medical form completed by his general practitioner did not address the statutory distinction between familiar and unfamiliar routes, and that the tribunal had drawn impermissible inferences from the absence of prescribed eye drops. The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of a relevant change of circumstances justifying termination of the award.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Mr Justice Sumner delivered the judgment, with Lord Justice Sedley and Lord Justice Ward agreeing.

1. The governing test was section 73(1)(d) of the Social Security Contributions & Benefits Act 1992. The appellant had to be able to walk but be so severely physically or mentally disabled that, disregarding routes familiar to him, he could not take advantage of walking outdoors without guidance or supervision from another person most of the time.
2. A fact-finding tribunal may draw reasonable inferences from evidence before it. It may not speculate about the answer that might have been given to a relevant question which was not asked. That restriction was especially important where the proposed inference concerned specialised medical opinion.
3. The general practitioner’s form recorded that the appellant could walk outdoors without another person’s help. It did not establish whether he could walk on unfamiliar routes without guidance or supervision. The word help was insufficiently specific to support a safe inference on that essential statutory issue. The question about walking before severe discomfort was directed to a different issue, associated with diabetes and the inability to walk limb of section 73(1)(a).
4. The tribunal also erred in treating the absence of eye drops from the general practitioner’s current prescription as evidence that blurred vision was no longer a problem. The form asked what was prescribed at the last consultation, and the appellant had positively stated that he was still using eye drops.
5. Because the questions asked and answers given did not provide a sufficient evidential basis for finding a relevant change of circumstances under section 30(2) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, termination of the award was unlawful. The appeal was allowed without remittal. The life award of the lower-rate mobility component was declared to subsist from 29 July 1999, and the respondent was directed to resume payment, quantify and pay the arrears within 28 days, and pay the appellant’s costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The life award was declared to subsist from 29 July 1999, with directions for payment of arrears and costs.
2. Social Security Commissioner: Commissioner Jacobs upheld the Birmingham Appeal Tribunal’s decision and refused leave to appeal.
3. Birmingham Appeal Tribunal: Dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 4 April 2000.
4. Adjudication officers: On review, concluded that the appellant no longer satisfied the conditions for the lower-rate mobility component.