Adlard & Ors v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions

A decision whether to call in a planning application concerns the procedure by which the planning merits will be determined. Ordinarily, the Secretary of State need not give full or narrative reasons for declining call-in, particularly because detailed reasons may generate satellite litigation and delay. However, where a major development may have exceptionally important consequences for local residents, the Secretary of State should consider whether an oral hearing is required. It is arguable that this consideration may be required even though an objector has no clear right to an oral hearing under Article 6 of the Convention.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to call in applications concerning the redevelopment of Fulham football ground. The applications involved a large stadium, ancillary facilities, residential accommodation and works affecting listed buildings and a conservation area.

Collins J dismissed the claim on grounds including alleged inconsistency with an earlier call-in decision, failure to give reasons, and alleged obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Permission to appeal was refused on paper and the applicants renewed their application before the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether it was arguable that the Secretary of State had failed to consider whether the circumstances exceptionally required an oral hearing.

1. Application allowed on a limited basis. Permission to appeal was granted only on the arguable issue whether the Secretary of State should have considered if an oral hearing was required. The appeal was ordered to be expedited, with costs in the appeal.
2. The decision under section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is a decision about the procedure by which planning merits are to be determined, not a determination of those merits. The Secretary of State has a very wide discretion whether to call in an application.
3. In that procedural context, the court should not ordinarily impose a duty to give full or narrative reasons. Such a duty could produce satellite litigation and delay, particularly where third-party interests are involved. The court noted the reasoning in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v SSETR [2001] 2 All ER 929, including the absence of a statutory requirement to give reasons.
4. The earlier call-in decision did not make the later refusal inconsistent. The applications were materially different, including because the later application was supported by a full environmental statement and detailed consideration of relevant matters. The Secretary of State was required to consider the individual merits of the application before him.
5. The court did not decide that the applicants had an enforceable right to an oral hearing. That argument was described as difficult. Nevertheless, given the scale of the development and residents’ concerns, including fears of violence, intimidation or abuse, it was arguable that the Secretary of State should exceptionally have considered whether an oral hearing was required. Lady Justice Arden agreed that the reasons given did not show consideration of those particular matters.

• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Collins J dismissed the judicial review claim on 17 January 2002.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused on paper on 7 March 2002. On renewal, the application was allowed on the limited oral-hearing issue and the appeal was ordered to be expedited.