United Building and Plumbing Contractors v Kajla

Under CPR 48.6(3), a litigant in person cannot recover fees for litigation assistance provided by a person who is neither a lawyer nor acting under a lawyer’s supervision. Such fees are neither disbursements within paragraph (3)(a) nor payments for “legal services” within paragraph (3)(b). The litigant may nevertheless recover allowable costs for personal work and qualifying disbursements.

Evidence of statements made during settlement negotiations is admissible by the parties’ consent. Consent may be inferred where both parties adduce evidence about settlement meetings, although particular caution is appropriate where a litigant acts in person. A settlement offer which the successful party fails to better may justify adjusting the costs incurred after the offer.

A building contractor recovered £4,708 in the Derby County Court for the outstanding contract price and additional work, together with £610 court fees and £3,000 costs. The customer appealed against the finding concerning additional work and the costs order.

The customer submitted that the judge had improperly relied on an admission allegedly made during settlement negotiations. He also contended that the costs award unlawfully included fees charged by a non-lawyer who had assisted the contractor, and that the award failed to reflect an offer of £10,000 which the contractor had not bettered at trial.

The central questions were whether the parties had consented to the admission of evidence about their settlement discussions and whether the disputed litigation and enforcement expenses were recoverable under CPR 48.6.

1. Appeal allowed in part. Tuckey LJ, with whom Rix LJ agreed, upheld the award of £4,708 and the £610 court fees. The County Court costs award of £3,000 was set aside and £1,441 substituted.

2. The general protection attaching to offers and statements made during settlement negotiations applies whether or not the parties use the label “without prejudice”. Such evidence may, however, be admitted with the parties’ consent. Although a litigant in person’s failure to object would not necessarily establish consent by itself, both parties had adduced evidence about meetings convened to settle the dispute. It was therefore fair to infer mutual consent.

3. In any event, the finding that additional works had been requested did not depend solely upon the settlement evidence. The trial judge had preferred the contractor’s evidence after considering his detailed account and contradictions in the customer’s statements. Those independent reasons amply justified the finding.

4. CPR 48.6(3)(a) concerns a litigant in person’s own time and disbursements which would have been recoverable had a legal representative done the work or incurred the expenditure. It did not cover fees charged by the non-lawyer who assisted the contractor, because a legal representative would not have incurred such a disbursement.

5. “Legal services” in CPR 48.6(3)(b) means services provided by a lawyer or under a lawyer’s supervision. The assistant had not provided services of that character. The judge therefore lacked jurisdiction to award any part of his fees, although the contractor could have received costs for his own work in preparing and presenting the case.

6. The £10,000 settlement offer should have been reflected in costs because the contractor failed to better it at trial. Costs before and after the offer were treated as cancelling one another out. The £1,441 sheriff’s fees remained recoverable as a litigant-in-person disbursement because they resulted from the customer’s failure to defend and the contractor’s justified attempt to enforce the default judgment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed to the extent that the County Court’s £3,000 costs award was set aside and £1,441 substituted. The remaining orders stood.

2. Derby County Court: His Honour Judge Styler ordered the customer to pay £4,708, £610 court fees and £3,000 costs after a two-day trial.