Begum, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An amendment to judicial review grounds may be treated as made on the date of the original application, but backdating does not remove delay measured from when the grounds first arose. An applicant must show good reason for extending the time limit. An arguable or even strong case does not, without more, constitute good reason where the delay is substantial and unexplained. The court may also refuse relief where granting it would harm good administration. In challenges to an illegal-entry decision, prolonged delay may itself create serious prejudice because the Secretary of State must prove deception and the relevant evidence may become difficult to establish.

The claimant entered the United Kingdom as a dependant of her father after marrying and ceasing to be his dependant. Following interviews concerning her husband's entry-clearance application, the Secretary of State treated her as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971.

She initially sought judicial review only of the refusal to grant exceptional leave on compassionate and family-life grounds. The Administrative Court later permitted amendment to challenge her illegal-entrant status. Stanley Burnton J dismissed the application for delay and held that relief would in any event be detrimental to good administration. The appeal concerned the effect of the amendment, the delay, and the good-administration ground.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the decision of Stanley Burnton J.
2. Although Burton J's permission to amend meant that the additional ground was treated as backdated to the Form 86A filed on 22 September 2000, the ground remained substantially out of time. The relevant decision had been communicated by 30 July 1999, or at latest by September 1999. Under Order 53, rule 4, an application had to be made promptly and within three months unless good reason for extending time was shown.
3. No good reason was established. The claimant's advisers had not challenged the illegal-entry decision until compassionate representations had failed. Her interview answers were damaging to the proposed case that neither she nor her mother intended to deceive. The possibility of an arguable claim did not amount to overwhelming merits capable of justifying the delay.
4. The Secretary of State's earlier delay in investigating the matter did not excuse the claimant's failure to challenge the decision promptly. Once the reasons for treating her as an illegal entrant had been made clear, prompt proceedings were required.
5. Separately, section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 permitted refusal of relief where granting it would be detrimental to good administration. The court was entitled to infer serious administrative prejudice from allowing stale challenges to illegal-entry decisions, particularly because the burden of proving deception lay on the Secretary of State.
6. The claimant relied on Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1984] AC 74, concerning the absence of a general duty of candour and the heavy civil burden of proving deception. That authority did not assist the argument for extending time on the facts of this case.

Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. There was no order for costs, save for detailed assessment of the claimant's Community Legal Services Funding.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal dismissed; permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
• Administrative Court, Queen's Bench Division: Stanley Burnton J dismissed the judicial review application on grounds of delay and detriment to good administration.