Smillie, R (on the application of) v Southend-On-Sea Borough Council

[2002] EWCA Civ 633

Case details

Case citations
[2002] EWCA Civ 633
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
2 May 2002
Judgment text

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Subjects
Public law Judicial review Permission to appeal
Keywords
judicial review permission to appeal adjournment statutory demand council tax liability administrative recourse
Outcome
application for permission to appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Summary

A pending administrative challenge to an assessment does not suspend or invalidate enforcement based on the assessment currently in force. If the assessment later changes, the enforcement measure must be adjusted rather than treated as void. An adjournment is not justified where the further administrative recourse is immaterial to the judicial review and the applicant has already obtained an adjournment. Permission to appeal may be refused where the proposed material would not have altered the lower court’s decision.

Factual background

The applicant sought permission to appeal against Mr Justice Hooper’s refusal, in her absence, to adjourn a renewed application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings. The proposed judicial review concerned the respondent council’s decision to replace deductions from benefits and a pension for unpaid local taxation liabilities with a statutory demand. Mr Justice Munby had earlier refused permission on the papers, considering the complaint unarguable. The applicant relied on a recently received council letter indicating that an administrative appeal concerning part of her liability remained unresolved. The central issues were whether that pending administrative process justified an adjournment and whether a possible future reassessment would invalidate the statutory demand.

Held

Application dismissed. Lord Justice Sedley reconsidered the matter afresh after accepting that the applicant had not received notice of an earlier relisted hearing. He nevertheless concluded that there was no proper basis for permission to appeal.

  1. No extension of time was required because the application had been made in time.
  2. The refusal to grant a further adjournment was correct. The applicant had already obtained one adjournment, and the council’s pending administrative procedures provided the appropriate route for further recourse. Their pendency did not affect the judicial review proceedings. The applicant should have attended the hearing on 12 October 2001. Even if Mr Justice Hooper had known of the letter received the previous evening, he would still have been entitled to proceed as he did.
  3. The suggested connection between reassessment and the statutory demand was rejected. The demand was based on an assessment which remained extant and lawful. A later administrative alteration would require the demand to be adjusted, but would not make it void. The question whether the properties constituted one, two or three taxable units was not for the court in these proceedings.
  4. The application for permission to appeal was therefore dismissed. The transcript was to be supplied to both parties at public expense.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Sedley refused permission to appeal and dismissed the application.
  2. High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Justice Hooper refused, in the applicant’s absence, to adjourn the renewed application for permission to seek judicial review and consequently refused permission, with a costs order of £1,900.
  3. High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Justice Munby had earlier refused permission to seek judicial review on the papers.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
application for permission to appeal dismissed

Key cases cited

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Cases citing this case

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.