Jones v Twinsectra Ltd

Section 73 of the Solicitors Act 1974 gives a solicitor a beneficial charging-order remedy, but it does not displace the protective provisions governing recovery and taxation of solicitors’ costs. In particular, the requirement in section 69(3) that bills exceeding £5,000 be taxed in the Supreme Court Costs Office continues to apply where taxation follows a charging order. A mistaken order cannot confer jurisdiction which the court lacks. Nor can parties confer that jurisdiction by agreement unless the statutory requirements are satisfied. A consent order must be examined to determine whether it records a binding contract or merely an order made without objection.

The appellant represented residents who had successfully obtained the freehold of their properties. Their solicitor, Mr Kennedy, sought recovery of his costs by a charging order under section 73 of the Solicitors Act 1974. The county court ordered that the costs be assessed there.

The clients later applied for taxation in the Supreme Court Costs Office, arguing that section 69(3) required bills exceeding £5,000 to be taxed there. The deputy district judge rejected the application. On appeal, His Honour Judge Michael Cook held that the county court lacked jurisdiction and that the costs should be taxed in the High Court costs jurisdiction. The central issues were the interaction between sections 69(3) and 73, and whether the parties’ consent order had conferred jurisdiction on the county court.

1. Appeal dismissed. The county court had no jurisdiction to tax the bills, and the matter was required to proceed in the Supreme Court Costs Office. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents’ appeal costs, assessed at £4,500.
2. Section 73 provides a solicitor with a charging-order remedy over property recovered or preserved through the solicitor’s instrumentality. The wide power to make such orders as the court thinks fit principally concerns securing and recovering payment. It does not create an unrestricted, freestanding power to tax costs.
3. Sections 69 to 71 form a protective code regulating recovery and taxation of solicitors’ costs. The requirement in section 69(3) that a bill exceeding £5,000 be dealt with in the High Court costs jurisdiction remains applicable to taxation arising under section 73. The solicitor seeking the benefit of the charging order must accept the corresponding statutory protections for the client.
4. The earlier order directing taxation in the county court could not prevent a later jurisdictional objection. A court cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by making an order on a mistaken basis. The position was materially different from Re Gale, where the order had been made within an existing jurisdiction.
5. The consent order did not amount to a binding agreement under section 18 of the County Courts Act 1984. Applying the approach in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd, the correspondence showed reservation rather than a contractual agreement to confer exclusive county-court jurisdiction. In any event, section 18 was unavailable because the relevant charging-order matter would, if commenced in the High Court, have been assigned to the Chancery Division.
6. The allocation provisions in Schedule 1 and section 61 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, and Order 106 rule 2.2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, did not alter the specific allocation of charging-order matters to the Chancery Division.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Michael Cook in the Staines County Court dismissed. The court held that taxation belonged in the Supreme Court Costs Office.
• Staines County Court: the deputy district judge’s order retaining taxation in the county court was reversed by His Honour Judge Michael Cook, who held that the county court lacked jurisdiction.