Allinson v Harrogate Borough Council

On a second appeal, permission requires an important point of policy or principle. A challenge to the underlying debt or adjudicative process cannot ordinarily be reopened in proceedings to set aside a statutory demand founded on a judgment or order. The court must not go behind that judgment or order or inquire into the debt’s validity, and will not generally adjourn to await an application to set it aside. Decisions made before 2 October 2000 were not covered by the Human Rights Act. At the relevant time, the composition of the housing-benefit review board was prescribed by regulation, so no common-law challenge was available on that basis. Permission was refused.

This was an application for permission to bring a second appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Taylor in the Leeds County Court dated 1 June 2001. Judge Taylor had dismissed an appeal from Deputy District Judge Ashton’s order of 12 December 2000 concerning an application to set aside a statutory demand. The demand sought recovery of an alleged £14,500 housing-benefit overpayment determined by Harrogate Borough Council’s Housing Review Board on 28 September 1999. The applicant argued that the Board’s councillor composition breached his human rights. The central issues were whether the lower courts could reopen the underlying determination when considering the statutory demand and whether the Board’s composition was legally challengeable.

Lord Justice Buxton, sitting alone, refused permission to bring a second appeal and dismissed the application.

1. Permission threshold. Because this was a second appeal, the applicant had to establish an important point of policy or principle. No such point arose, and there was no basis for concluding that Judge Taylor had been wrong.
2. Statutory demand. Paragraph 12.3 of the Practice Direction on insolvency proceedings made clear that, where a statutory demand was based on a judgment or order, the court would not go behind that judgment or order to inquire into the validity of the debt. As a general rule, it would not adjourn the application to await an application to set aside the judgment or order. The County Court therefore could not reopen the Housing Review Board’s determination when dealing with the statutory demand.
3. Human-rights and common-law objections. The relevant Harrogate decisions predated 2 October 2000 and were not covered by the Human Rights Act. As to English common-law grounds, the composition of the Review Board by councillors was statutorily provided for by regulation 7 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 1986. The applicant was therefore not in a position to challenge those decisions on that basis.
4. Alternative procedural conclusion. Even if the underlying challenge had been open, neither Judge Taylor nor the Deputy District Judge could have reopened the question previously determined by the Housing Review Board in proceedings concerning the statutory demand.

There was accordingly no basis for intervention by the Court of Appeal. Permission was not granted. Application dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 1 May 2002, Lord Justice Buxton refused permission to bring a second appeal and dismissed the application.
2. Leeds County Court: On 1 June 2001, His Honour Judge Taylor dismissed the appeal from Deputy District Judge Ashton’s order.
3. Leeds County Court: On 12 December 2000, Deputy District Judge Ashton dealt with the application to set aside the statutory demand.