Robinson v Colin Watson & Co (A Firm) & Anor

A second appeal should be permitted only where it raises an important point of principle or practice, or where another compelling reason exists. That restrictive threshold applies even where the lower appellate judge disagreed with the first-instance judge. On a review under the Civil Procedure Rules, the reviewing judge may interfere where the earlier decision was clearly wrong or legally misdirected. The function is supervisory review, rather than a full rehearing on appeal. A case-management decision concerning joinder and limitation prejudice will not justify a second appeal merely because the applicant says the judge reached the wrong factual assessment.

The claimant brought professional negligence proceedings against two firms of solicitors arising from earlier litigation that had been commenced while she was bankrupt and was subsequently struck out or discontinued. The second defendant was joined to proceedings issued against the first defendant, with the joinder taking effect from the date of issue. The County Court judge allowed the second defendant’s appeal from the District Judge, concluding that the relation-back effect of joinder might deprive the second defendant of a limitation defence.

The claimant renewed her application for permission to bring a second appeal to the Court of Appeal. She challenged the application of the principles in Welsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1409, the factual assessment of possible limitation prejudice, the judge’s power to review the District Judge’s decision, and the costs order.

1. Second appeal threshold. The application was dismissed. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and CPR Part 52, permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason. The test applies whether or not the courts below agreed.
2. Joinder and limitation prejudice. The County Court judge was entitled to conclude that relation back might give the claimant an advantage by depriving the second defendant of a possible limitation defence. It was reasonably open that, on the evidence at trial, the claimant either knew, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the relevant facts by the end of 1988, so that the statutory extension for concealment under section 32 of the Limitation Act might not be available.
3. Review of a District Judge’s decision. Under the new Civil Procedure Rules regime, the County Court judge’s function was review rather than a pure appeal. The judge could interfere if the District Judge was clearly wrong or had misdirected himself in law. Applying the principles stated in Welsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1409, the judge was entitled to hold that the District Judge had not applied the law correctly.
4. Costs. The order requiring the second defendant to recover its costs of defending the action from the claimant was unobjectionable. Any argument about postponing recovery until the claimant’s new action against that defendant had been pursued was a matter for the costs judge.

• County Court: On 7 December 2001, Judge Tetlow allowed the second defendant’s appeal from the District Judge’s order of 28 August 2001.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The renewed application for permission to bring a second appeal was dismissed.