F (a Child)

In determining contact between a child and a parent, the court must evaluate the expert evidence accurately and give proper weight to the benefits and risks of different contact arrangements. A court should not impose a lengthy moratorium where the evidence supports a realistic, gradual reintroduction of contact. The welfare assessment must include the effect of delay on the child and on the parent-child relationship. Psychiatric treatment affecting contact should be pursued urgently, but treatment delays do not justify indefinitely suspending contact. Appellate intervention is justified where the first-instance judge has misunderstood material evidence, failed to address relevant considerations, or reached a discretionary conclusion unsupported by the evidence.

The father appealed from an order made by Her Honour Judge Case in the Newport County Court. The judge refused his application for residence, suspended direct contact with his seven-year-old daughter for 18 months, and permitted only indirect contact. The proceedings followed a prolonged history of contact disputes after the parents’ violent relationship had ended.

The mother suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Expert evidence differed about the timing and therapeutic value of renewed contact. The central issues were whether the judge had properly understood the evidence, whether the hearing had been fair, and whether the 18-month suspension was a lawful exercise of discretion.

1. Appeal allowed. Thorpe LJ, with whom Waller LJ and Buxton LJ agreed, held that the judge had not sufficiently reflected Professor Maguire’s evidence. She had treated a suggestion of limited contact as if it were a firm recommendation for one hour monthly, and had preferred Dr Jamil’s contrary view on an unsustainable foundation.
2. The judge had also failed properly to understand or record Dr Gay’s central opinion. The appropriate management was to restart contact from a realistic and limited basis and build it up gradually, allowing the child to take the major steps. The evidence did not support the judge’s conclusion that monthly contact would exacerbate the father’s anger and frustration.
3. The 18-month suspension created a serious risk that the relationship between father and child would deteriorate to the point where restoration became difficult or impossible. Relevant considerations included the father’s continuing pursuit of lawful remedies, the previous judicial management of contact, the apparent success of gradual contact, and the delay in obtaining psychiatric treatment.
4. The court was also concerned that the treatment required by the medical evidence had been substantially delayed. Treatment was urgent in the mother’s interests and because contact could not begin until treatment commenced. The order was therefore varied to provide for direct contact for one day each month, beginning when the mother’s psychotherapeutic treatment started.
5. The case was transferred to the Family Division for further management. The mother was directed to provide a full account of treatment received and steps taken to begin treatment. Costs were subject to public funding assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The order was varied to provide for monthly direct contact, subject to commencement of the mother’s treatment, and the case was transferred to the Family Division.
• Newport County Court: Her Honour Judge Case refused the father’s residence application and suspended direct contact for 18 months, while allowing reasonable indirect contact.