Taylor v London Borough Of Enfield

In determining vulnerability for statutory homelessness purposes, a local housing authority must ask whether, when homeless, the applicant would be less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, such that injury or detriment would result where a less vulnerable person could cope. Vulnerability must not be equated simply with an inability to secure accommodation. The Pereira guidance was sufficiently clear and required no further restatement. On a second appeal, permission may be granted only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or where there is some other compelling reason. Sympathy or unease about the decision is insufficient.

Mr Taylor appealed under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against Enfield’s decision that he was not homeless and in priority need. The local authority’s review panel considered his medical conditions, drug and alcohol history, and medical evidence, but concluded that he was not vulnerable. His appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Karsten QC at the Central London County Court.

Mr Taylor sought permission for a further appeal. The proposed grounds were that the panel had applied the wrong legal test and that its conclusion was perverse. The application therefore raised the interaction between the statutory vulnerability test, the Pereira guidance, and the stringent second-appeal permission requirements.

1. Application refused. The court unanimously refused permission for a second appeal.
2. The relevant statutory question was whether Mr Taylor was vulnerable within section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996. The court reaffirmed the guidance in R v Camden LBC ex p Pereira, namely that the authority must consider whether, when homeless, the applicant would be less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, so that injury or detriment would result where a less vulnerable person could cope. It was common ground that vulnerability could not be equated simply with inability, or reduced ability, to secure accommodation.
3. Although the review panel’s reasons could have been expressed more clearly, the operative paragraph corrected the possible error in the preceding paragraph. The panel had considered the available medical information and reached a conclusion which the county court judge was entitled to regard as involving no significant error of law. The reasons of a busy local authority review panel should not be subjected to the closest analytical scrutiny.
4. The perversity challenge was more substantial. The decision was surprising, particularly because the panel did not expressly assess or mention the GP’s later letter. Nevertheless, the case was a second appeal within section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The court could grant permission only if the appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for hearing it. A borderline perversity issue on which different minds might reach different conclusions did not satisfy that test. Personal sympathy and judicial unease could not erode the statutory threshold.
5. The principles in Pereira were clear, and no further guidance was required. The court accordingly refused permission, ordered a detailed assessment of the publicly funded applicant’s costs, and directed that the transcript be provided at public expense.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — renewed application for permission to appeal refused.
• Central London County Court — His Honour Judge Karsten QC dismissed Mr Taylor’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996.
• Enfield review panel — concluded that Mr Taylor was not vulnerable and therefore was not in priority need.