Adoko v Lewis

Summary judgment is appropriate where a defamation claim has no real prospect of success and no evidence could properly support malice defeating qualified privilege. A claimant’s sense of grievance, the history of earlier disputes, and allegations concerning the defendant’s previous conduct do not suffice without material capable of supporting an averment of malice. The possibility that the defendant is a solicitor or part-time judge, and that the issues may have public interest, does not provide a compelling reason for a hopeless claim to proceed to trial. Evidence describing past events as the witness’s recollection remains evidence from which the court may find the underlying facts.

The applicant brought a defamation claim concerning a letter written by the defendant to an internet service provider. The letter sought removal of the applicant’s book from the provider’s website and described allegations in the book as absurd. The defendant relied on privilege and obtained summary judgment from Gray J on 6 March 2002 under CPR Part 24.2.

On the application for permission to appeal, the applicant accepted that the occasion was privileged but argued that the surrounding history and documents could support malice. He also relied on the alleged public importance of the issues and challenged the adequacy of the defendant’s witness statement. The central questions were whether the claim had any real prospect of success, whether there was another compelling reason for a trial, and whether the evidence properly put the relevant facts in issue.

1. Application refused. The applicant accepted that publication of the defendant’s letter occurred on a privileged occasion. The issue was therefore whether there was material capable of supporting malice.
2. The history of the applicant’s dispute with the Law Society, earlier correspondence, and the defendant’s conduct in related proceedings did not provide evidence which could properly support an averment of malice. The claim consequently had no real prospect of succeeding on appeal.
3. Although CPR Part 24 requires consideration of whether there is another compelling reason for the matter to proceed to trial, the defendant’s professional status and part-time judicial role did not justify requiring him to meet a hopeless claim. There was no compelling reason to depart from the ordinary course where the claim was manifestly hopeless.
4. The pleading objection was misconceived. The defendant’s witness statement put in issue the assertion that the applicant’s complaints were absurd. A witness’s account of past events as recollection is evidence of those events; the court may determine the underlying facts from it.
5. Gray J was entitled, on the material before him, to conclude that the proceedings should not trouble the court further. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Latham refused permission to appeal and dismissed the application on 24 May 2002.
• High Court: Gray J granted the defendant summary judgment on 6 March 2002 under CPR Part 24.2, effectively dismissing the defamation claim.