Kides, R (on the application of) v South Cambridgeshire District Council

A refusal of permission to appeal on the papers may be revisited through renewal. A later appellate decision materially changing the law on public-law time limits may justify reconsideration of permission. Where a planning decision has crystallised only recently, and judicial review proceedings were lodged within three months, the requirement of promptness must be handled with great circumspection. The court may retain the judicial review application for determination where the first-instance judgment followed full argument and remittal would be inappropriate.

The claimant sought permission to appeal from the judgment of Ouseley J in the Administrative Court. Lord Justice Sedley had initially refused permission on the papers because the then current decision in Burkett appeared to prevent the claim on grounds of delay.

The House of Lords subsequently decided Burkett. The claimant’s planning-related judicial review application had been lodged within three months of the planning permission crystallising. The issue was whether the later decision justified reopening the permission question and, if so, whether the matter should be remitted to the High Court.

1. The paper refusal of permission could be revisited through a renewed application. CPR 52.3(4), as understood by the court, meant that the written decision could not simply be reopened administratively, so the matter was listed in open court for formal reconsideration.

2. The subsequent House of Lords decision in Burkett had opened a new chapter on time bars in public law. It indicated that, where the planning permission crystallised on 16 October 2000 and judicial review was lodged on 27 November 2000, the time issue appeared favourable to the claimant. Promptness within the three-month period was to be handled with great circumspection.

3. In light of that development, permission to appeal was granted. The judgment of Ouseley J had followed full argument on both sides, and it was therefore inappropriate to remit the case to the High Court.

4. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted under CPR 52.15(3). Under CPR 52.15(4), the application was directed to remain in the Court of Appeal for determination. The costs of the permission application were costs in the case, subject to liberty to apply.

• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Ouseley J determined the judicial review claim, following full argument. No citation for that decision is stated in the judgment.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Sedley revisited the earlier paper refusal, granted permission to appeal and permission to apply for judicial review, and directed that the application remain in this court for determination.