Mijakovac v Official Receivers Office

A second appeal to the Court of Appeal is subject to the particularly stringent test in section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. It is not an appropriate forum for a fresh investigation of allegations against an insolvency practitioner, especially where the evidence was not placed before the lower courts and there is no satisfactory explanation for that omission. An application to reopen the basis of a bankruptcy order under section 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986 will not be entertained through such an appeal where that issue has already been determined.

The applicant sought permission for a second appeal from the order of His Honour Judge Langan QC in the Chancery Division, which dismissed her appeal from District Judge Lord’s order in Leeds County Court. The underlying application sought annulment of a 1996 bankruptcy order under section 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The applicant argued that the order ought not to have been made because her assets were sufficient to pay her debts, and sought to raise allegations about the insolvency practitioner’s conduct. That issue had previously been rejected on appeal by Judge Maddocks. The central question was whether the Court of Appeal should permit a further appeal to reopen it.

Lord Justice Robert Walker, sitting alone, dismissed the application for permission to appeal. There was no order for costs.

1. The proposed appeal was a second appeal. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposed a particularly stringent test.
2. A second appeal to the Court of Appeal was a wholly inappropriate forum for a fresh investigation of complaints against a licensed insolvency practitioner. The applicant’s evidence and allegations had not been before either judge below, and there was no satisfactory explanation for that omission. The Court had heard only one side of the allegations.
3. Section 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provided distinct grounds for annulment. Section 282(1)(a) concerned grounds existing when the bankruptcy order was made which showed that it ought not to have been made. Section 282(1)(b) concerned the subsequent payment or securing of the bankruptcy debts and expenses. The official receiver’s representative had no objection to annulment on the latter ground, but the applicant’s challenge under section 282(1)(a) had already been heard and determined on appeal by Judge Maddocks.
4. The Court would not use the proposed second appeal, made more than five years after the bankruptcy order, to reopen that issue or investigate the applicant’s complaints. An independent investigation by the Insolvency Service was a more appropriate avenue for those complaints. The application was therefore dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 12 June 2002, dismissed the application for permission to bring a second appeal from the High Court order. No order for costs.
2. High Court (Chancery Division): On 18 October 2001, His Honour Judge Langan QC dismissed the applicant’s appeal from District Judge Lord’s order and declined to reopen the question whether the bankruptcy order ought to have been made.
3. Leeds County Court: On 4 September 2001, District Judge Lord refused annulment under section 282(1)(a). The judgment records that the official receiver’s representative had no objection to annulment under section 282(1)(b).
4. Leeds County Court: On 18 November 1996, Judge Maddocks dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the bankruptcy order.