Century SA (UK) Ltd. v Clibbery & Anor

Summary judgment is inappropriate where an assurance of continued occupation and detriment arising from conduct at the promisor’s request are reasonably arguable. The court should proceed on the basis that the alleged assurance was given and leave its context and the parties’ reasonable understanding to trial. Family circumstances and the fact that the claimed relief would permit lifelong non-exclusive occupation of a substantial property may make the claim difficult, but do not justify summary determination. A title objection may be finally resolved where the evidence admits only that the person granting the licence acted as the company’s agent.

The respondent company sought possession of a property occupied by the appellants, a mother and daughter. The mother said that the company’s controlling individual had told her she could live there for as long as she wished, and that she had thereafter helped run the property and performed work at his request. The Deputy Master declined summary judgment in material part, but a Chancery Division deputy judge allowed the company’s appeal and gave judgment for the company, holding that the assistance was not detriment and that proprietary estoppel was not alleged. The appellants appealed. The central questions were whether the case should proceed to trial on proprietary estoppel and whether the company’s title could be challenged.

Appeal allowed. Longmore LJ gave the first judgment. Mance LJ and Peter Gibson LJ agreed.

1. On an application for summary judgment, the court had to proceed on the basis that the alleged assurance was given. It was arguable that the claim was one of proprietary estoppel and that conduct undertaken at the promisor’s request could conceivably constitute sufficient detriment. The context in which the assurance was given and the parties’ reasonable understanding of it required factual investigation at trial.
2. The pleaded claim had initially been put as a constructive trust, but was confined on appeal to a claim for a non-exclusive licence to occupy the property for the remainder of the mother’s life, based on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as set out in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 211. The family context, the absence of an exclusive licence, and the surprising nature of the claimed result did not justify deciding the issue summarily.
3. The title point was finally determined. When the licence was granted, the individual who controlled the company must, on the ordinary view, have been acting as its agent. The appellants could not pursue that challenge at trial.
4. The court directed that the matter proceed to trial and suggested that the parties consider a sensible compromise. The appellants were awarded 80 per cent of their costs before the Deputy Judge and in the Court of Appeal. Mrs Clibbery was awarded 90 per cent of her costs, and the Master’s order for costs in the case was reinstated.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal, set aside the Chancery Division judgment and directed that the proprietary estoppel issues proceed to trial.
2. Chancery Division: on 21 March 2003, Mr Peter Leaver QC, sitting as a deputy judge, allowed the company’s appeal from the Deputy Master and gave judgment for the company.
3. Chancery Division, Deputy Master: on 23 September 2002, Deputy Master Mark declined to dispose of the claim summarily in material part, finding an arguable case that the mother’s work was undertaken because she had been told she could remain in possession for as long as she wished.