Morrison v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police

In a civil jury trial, the court must guard against pressure on jurors to reach a majority verdict. The Watson approach requires the judge to emphasise the jurors’ oath and their freedom to report that agreement cannot be reached, while recognising the desirability of avoiding a retrial. A departure from that approach does not automatically invalidate the verdict. The appellate court must examine the precise circumstances and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of improper pressure. Where the judge made clear that the jury must honour its oath, did not require or invite further deliberation, and the jury itself requested more time, the verdict was not improperly pressured.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Chief Constable for damages arising from her arrest, alleged assault and prosecution following an incident involving police officers. She had been acquitted of an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.

Liability was tried before a judge and an eight-person jury in the Birmingham County Court. The jury agreed on four questions but initially remained divided on two questions central to liability. The judge referred to the expense of a further trial and allowed the jury to retire again. After a further short deliberation, at least seven jurors agreed on both outstanding questions in the claimant’s favour.

The Chief Constable appealed on the ground that the answers had resulted from pressure by the judge. The central issue was whether the judge’s handling of the apparent deadlock created a reasonable apprehension of improper pressure.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court applied the approach stated by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Watson. A judge dealing with an apparent jury deadlock should protect jurors from pressure while recognising the public interest in avoiding the delay, expense and uncertainty of a second trial.
2. The judge should have given a Watson direction, but that omission was not decisive. The court had to examine what precisely occurred and whether the circumstances created a reasonable apprehension of improper pressure.
3. The judge reminded the jury that each juror must honour the oath and said that, if there was no prospect of agreement, the trial would have to end. He did not require or invite further deliberation. The foreman asked about the required majority, and the jury then requested more time. The final retirement was therefore at the jury’s own behest. There was no reasonable apprehension of improper pressure.
4. The court left open whether the strict approach developed in criminal cases was equally applicable to civil jury proceedings under the Civil Procedure Rules.
5. Lord Phillips added that section 17(2) of the Juries Act 1974 required seven of eight jurors to agree for a non-unanimous verdict, subject to section 17(5), which permitted a narrower majority with the parties’ consent and agreement to proceed with an incomplete jury. He identified a possible tension with CPR 1.3, but the court did not explore it.
6. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of £4,722.60.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the order of His Honour Judge Taylor in the Birmingham County Court dated 7 October 2002. Appeal dismissed.