Nawaz & Anor v Crowe Insurance Group

For an insurer to avoid liability under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, section 152(1)(a) requires notice of the bringing of proceedings before, or within seven days after, their commencement. Notice may be oral and need not be given by the claimant, but it must be communicated to an appropriate person with sufficient formality to indicate that proceedings are being commenced. Whether the recipient is appropriate, and whether the notice is sufficient, are matters of fact and degree. A legal secretary may be an appropriate recipient where notice to her would reasonably be expected to reach the solicitor acting for the insurer. Clear written notice remains the prudent course. The Civil Procedure Rules may provide relief where insurers fail to appreciate timely notice.

The claimants obtained default judgment against the alleged driver of a vehicle involved in a road accident and then brought proceedings against the respondent insurers as successors to the relevant insurers. The insurers denied liability under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 because they had not received proper notice under section 152(1)(a).

The District Judge found that a trainee solicitor had telephoned the secretary of the insurers’ solicitors, stated that proceedings were then being issued, and sought the alleged driver’s details. He held that this amounted to sufficient notice. His Honour Judge Tetlow allowed the insurers’ appeal and entered judgment for them. The central issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the secretary was an appropriate recipient and whether the communication was sufficient notice.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The judgment of His Honour Judge Tetlow was set aside. The insurers were to be joined as second defendants. The claimants were awarded their costs before the District Judge but not thereafter. The costs of setting aside the Circuit Judge’s decision were costs in the case, and the insurers had liberty to apply to set aside the order for deemed service.
2. Section 152(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 requires notice of the bringing of proceedings. The purpose is to give insurers an opportunity to protect their position, including by seeking a declaration under section 152(2) or becoming parties under section 152(4). Notice is a matter of fact and degree. It may be oral, may precede commencement, need not emanate from the claimant, and need not specify the precise proceedings or court. These principles were drawn from Wylie v Wake [2001] RTR 291 and Desouza v Waterlow [1999] RTR 71.
3. There must be more than a casual remark. Oral notice requires a degree of formality indicating that notice is being given. The decisive question is whether the communication clearly conveys that proceedings are being commenced.
4. A legal secretary may be an appropriate recipient where, in the circumstances, it is reasonable to give notice to her and her role and established practice make it reasonable to expect the communication to reach the solicitor or insurer. It was immaterial that the trainee solicitor did not expressly ask her to pass on a message or did not appreciate the statutory significance of the call.
5. The statement that proceedings were then being issued, made while seeking information needed to identify the defendant, was sufficiently clear. The District Judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and should not have been disturbed on appeal. Lord Justice Kennedy agreed, while stressing the practical importance of clear, timely written notice and referring to Herbert v Railway Passenger Assurance Co [1938] 60 LlL Rep 143.
6. The court accepted that the Civil Procedure Rules supplied procedural means of avoiding undue hardship and enabling the insurers to investigate their allegations of collusion or dishonesty.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the claimants’ appeal, set aside the judgment of His Honour Judge Tetlow, and directed that the insurers be joined as second defendants.
• Bury County Court: The District Judge found that sufficient notice had been given and entered judgment for the claimants. His Honour Judge Tetlow allowed the insurers’ appeal and entered judgment for the insurers. No citation for that decision was stated in the judgment.