Foumeny v University of Leeds

In a negligence claim for psychiatric injury caused by workplace stress, liability depends on more than proof of unfair, oppressive or unreasonable treatment. The claimant must establish that injury to health attributable to work stress was reasonably foreseeable, that the employer failed to take reasonable steps in the circumstances, and that the breach caused or materially contributed to the injury. Reasonableness depends on matters including the magnitude and gravity of the risk, the cost and practicability of preventive steps, and any justification for running the risk. An appellate court will not interfere with factual and discretionary conclusions that were open to the trial judge. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

The appellant, a university chemical engineering academic, claimed that the University of Leeds was liable in negligence and contract for psychiatric injury allegedly caused by the conduct of senior colleagues during departmental reorganisation, disciplinary concerns and disputes over his role. His Honour Judge Grenfell, sitting as a High Court Judge at Leeds District Registry, held on 8 July 2002 that the claim could not succeed.

The appellant challenged factual findings, the refusal of late evidence, and the conclusions on foreseeability, breach of duty and causation. The central issue was whether the evidence disclosed a real prospect that the trial judge had erred in applying the principles governing stress-related psychiatric injury.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The trial judge had carefully considered the evidence and reached conclusions that were open to him. The appellant’s disagreements with those conclusions did not disclose a realistic prospect of a successful appeal.
2. The applicable principles were those stated by Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] 2 All ER 1. The threshold question was whether injury to the particular employee’s health, attributable to stress at work, was reasonably foreseeable. The employer was generally entitled to assume that an employee could withstand normal job pressures unless it knew of a particular problem or vulnerability.
3. Where a duty to take steps arose, breach depended on whether the employer had failed to take steps that were reasonable in the circumstances. Relevant considerations included the magnitude of the risk, the gravity of the possible harm, the costs and practicability of prevention, and the justification for running the risk. The employer could reasonably be expected to take only steps likely to do some good, and the claimant had to prove that breach caused or materially contributed to the injury.
4. The trial judge was entitled to find that psychiatric illness was not foreseeable before May 1997, that the relevant conduct was not a deliberate campaign of harassment, and that the disciplinary investigation and refusal to institute a grievance procedure were justified in the circumstances. Once the risk became foreseeable, reversing the reorganisation or restoring the appellant to the headship was not realistic. The evidence did not show that the University could reasonably have been expected to do more than advise medical attention or rest, particularly when the appellant’s own doctor had not considered intervention necessary until 24 July.
5. The criticisms concerning irrelevant race-discrimination findings, the KPMG report, descriptions of witnesses, factual conclusions, and refusal of late evidence did not undermine the decision on the issues before the court. The separate human-rights analysis under Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the European Convention added nothing of substance to the pleaded case.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 16 April 2003, the application for permission to appeal was refused.
• High Court of Justice, Leeds District Registry: His Honour Judge Grenfell, sitting as a High Court Judge, held on 8 July 2002 that the claim could not succeed.