Lambeth v Lindsay

Where an application concerns implementation of a specified part of an earlier order and the parties agree the basis of compliance, the court should confine itself to that limited issue. It should not investigate or approve the substantive legality of the agreed arrangements. A consent order requiring reassessment does not promise an offer of accommodation or determine the applicant’s substantive entitlement. Nor does it prevent other applicants from challenging continuing conduct under an existing declaration of illegality. The court may express concern about delay and continued reliance on an unlawful scheme, but observations about interim arrangements do not determine their legality or practicability.

The earlier appeal arose from decisions concerning Lambeth’s housing allocation scheme. On 23 July 2002, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Council’s appeal in [2002] EWCA Civ 1084 and upheld a declaration that Group D of the July 2000 scheme was unlawful because it failed to secure the statutory reasonable preferences required by section 167(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and failed to provide a composite assessment of need.

The earlier order required reassessment of the claimant’s housing needs, with liberty to apply. The Council sought an extension because its replacement policy could not be implemented promptly. Before the present hearing, the parties agreed the basis on which Mr Lindsay’s reassessment would be conducted. The central issue was therefore whether further relief concerning reassessment was required and what effect the consent arrangement had.

1. Disposition. The application was not pursued after the parties reached terms concerning compliance with the reassessment order. A consent order was made, and the applicant was awarded the costs of and incidental to the hearing, with detailed assessment for public funding purposes.
2. Scope of the hearing. The Court had convened only to consider the reassessment provision in the earlier order. Once the parties agreed the basis of compliance, there was no need, and it was inappropriate, to investigate the wider disputes about the proposed allocation policy or interim measures. The court’s function was confined to the limited issue brought before it.
3. Effect of the consent order. The Council’s agreement did not amount to a promise that accommodation would be offered, either within a particular period or at all. The Court had not approved the lawfulness of the agreed basis for reassessment, and its legality neither received nor required approval at this hearing.
4. Effect on other applicants. The consent order did not prevent other applicants from raising challenges concerning the continuing lawfulness of the Council’s conduct in light of the existing declaration. That declaration remained in force.
5. Observations. The Court expressed grave concern about the delay and continued application of an unlawful scheme. It observed that the Council could not simply decline to make allocations while preparing a lawful policy, but did not decide whether proposed interim measures were practicable or lawful. The difficulties identified nevertheless highlighted the deficiencies in Group D, and the Court hoped that a lawful policy would be implemented promptly.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): At the present hearing, the parties agreed the basis on which the Council would comply with the reassessment order. The application was not pursued and was disposed of by consent order.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The earlier appeal was dismissed in [2002] EWCA Civ 1084. The declaration that Group D of the July 2000 housing allocation scheme was unlawful was upheld.
3. Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): Sullivan J’s decision dated 11 April 2002 declared Group D unlawful for failing to secure the statutory reasonable preferences required by section 167(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and for failing to provide a composite assessment of need.