Jones, R v

The Court of Appeal certified that the stated question concerning the interaction between offences under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 involved a point of law of general public importance under section 33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It nevertheless refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords under section 34(1). The underlying abuse-of-process question was therefore not determined by this judgment.

Following the Court of Appeal’s substantive judgment handed down on 20 December 2002, the appellant applied for certification of a point of law of general public importance and for leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

The proposed question was whether prosecuting indecent assault under section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was an abuse of process where the alleged conduct was unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, or an attempt, for which prosecution was barred by section 6(1), section 37(2), and paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) of the Second Schedule.

1. The court certified, under section 33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, that the appellant’s stated abuse-of-process question involved a point of law of general public importance.

2. The court nevertheless refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords under section 34(1). It did not decide the substantive question concerning the relationship between the relevant provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.

3. A representation order was granted for junior counsel and a solicitor for any further application to the House of Lords and, if leave were granted, for Queen’s Counsel, junior counsel and a solicitor.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On an application following its substantive judgment of 20 December 2002, the court certified a point of law of general public importance but refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
• Taunton Crown Court: The appeal originated from a decision of His Honour Judge Hume-Jones. The outcome and citation are not stated in the judgment.