Jackson, R v

Under Crime Sentences Act 1997, section 2, the mandatory life-sentence regime proceeds on the assumption that a person convicted of two serious offences presents a danger to the public. An offender is an exception to that norm where all relevant circumstances show that he does not present a significant or unacceptable risk on release.

The risk must be assessed as at the date of sentence. Later psychiatric and prison evidence may nevertheless be used where it sheds reliable light on the assessment that would probably have been made at that date. A life sentence imposed without considering that issue should be quashed where the available evidence indicates no serious or substantial future risk.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after striking the victim on the head with a hammer. A previous firearms conviction made him subject to the mandatory life-sentence provisions in section 2 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997. The sentencing judge imposed life imprisonment without a pre-sentence report and without considering future risk.

The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the sentence. It did so after R v Offen and Others [2001] 2 Cr App R(S) 44 clarified the meaning of exceptional circumstances. The central issue was whether the appellant presented a significant or unacceptable risk to the public when he was sentenced.

1. Appeal allowed. The life sentence was quashed. It was replaced with six years’ imprisonment for grievous bodily harm with intent, consecutive to the existing twelve-month sentence for breach of licence. The total term from the original sentencing date was therefore seven years.

2. Applying R v Offen and Others [2001] 2 Cr App R(S) 44, section 2 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997 establishes a norm that a person convicted of two serious offences presents a risk to the public. The statutory exception is engaged where, considering all circumstances relating to the offender, he does not create a significant or unacceptable risk. The sentencing judge had treated life imprisonment as inevitable and had not addressed that question. Grounds challenging that failure were made out.

3. Following R v Watkins [2002] Crim LR 594, the relevant risk is the risk at the time of sentence, rather than at the hearing of the appeal. Later reports are not excluded merely because they are not contemporaneous. They may be considered where they assist a just assessment of the risk that would probably have been identified at sentence.

   The prison material and psychiatric evidence could properly be used in that way. They indicated that, had a qualified assessment been sought, the appellant would likely have been assessed as posing neither a serious nor a substantial risk to the public on release. A mandatory life sentence was therefore not justified.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Allowed the appeal against sentence following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The court quashed the life sentence and substituted a determinate sentence.
• Crown Court at Manchester. On 8 June 2000, convicted the appellant of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and imposed life imprisonment under section 2 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997.