Stevens, R v

A breach of the requirement in Code D of the Code of Practice to hold an identification parade does not automatically make video-identification evidence unfair. The court must determine, under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, whether admission of the evidence obtained would be unfair. A properly conducted video procedure may remain admissible despite the earlier breach.

Where a life sentence is imposed, an activated suspended sentence must run concurrently. In fixing the minimum term, the court must assess the seriousness of the life-sentence offences without treating an unrelated suspended-sentence offence as associated with them. Departure from the usual 50 per cent approach requires exceptional circumstances.

The appellant was convicted at Reading Crown Court of five offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm arising from serious violence at a wedding reception. He maintained that he had acted in self-defence and challenged evidence obtained through a VIPER video-identification procedure.

The trial judge found that the police had prematurely decided not to hold a conventional identification parade, contrary to Code D, but admitted the video-identification evidence. The appellant appealed against conviction on the admissibility, fairness and summing-up of that evidence. He also appealed against concurrent life sentences and the minimum term, including the treatment of an activated suspended sentence for an unrelated burglary.

1. Conviction appeal dismissed. The police had breached Code D by deciding too hastily that a conventional identification parade was impracticable. That breach did not itself require exclusion. The judge correctly addressed the separate question under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: whether admission of the video-identification evidence would be unfair.
2. The VIPER procedure itself was fair. The appellant’s neck scar was not sufficiently noticeable to create a serious unfairness, and there was no evidential basis for concluding that a brief mobile telephone call could have conveyed information to a witness awaiting identification. The judge was therefore entitled to admit the evidence.
3. The summing-up did not improperly bolster the video-identification evidence. Although the judge explained features of the procedure, he also gave careful cautions about identification evidence. His approach accorded with the guidance in R v Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473. There was, in any event, substantial eyewitness and supporting evidence on each count of conviction.
4. Sentence appeal allowed to a limited extent. The activated suspended sentence could not run consecutively to life sentences and properly ran concurrently. But, under section 82(A) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, the unrelated burglary underlying that suspended sentence was not an associated offence when fixing the minimum term for the five wounding offences.
5. The appropriate minimum term was five years for those offences. This was not an exceptional case justifying movement from the usual 50 per cent approach towards two-thirds, as contemplated in R v Szczerba [2002] 2 Cr App R(S) 387. After credit for 10 months less two days on remand, the minimum period before Parole Board consideration was fixed at four years and two months.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against conviction. Allowed the appeal against sentence only to correct the minimum term.
• Crown Court at Reading: Convicted the appellant on 27 March 2002 of five offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. On 26 April 2002 imposed concurrent life sentences and dealt with an activated suspended sentence.